BYU Law Review
Volume 2019

Issue 1

Article 8

Summer 9-1-2019

Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right
Michael D. McNally

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael D. McNally, Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 205
(2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2019/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/13/19 10:16 AM

Native American Religious Freedom
as a Collective Right
Michael D. McNally*
INTRODUCTION : THE STRENGTH OF STANDING ROCK
AND THE WEAKNESS OF THE L AW ......................................................... 206
A. Structure of Argument .............................................................................. 213
B. Timeliness of Argument in Light of Hobby Lobby ............................... 215
I. JUDICIAL MISRECOGNITION OF NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS ................................................................ 218
A. First Amendment ....................................................................................... 219
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act ......................................................... 220
C. “Native Spirituality” and the Subversion of Religious Freedom
in Lyng and Navajo Nation .................................................................. 223
D. Religion as a Collective Category: Religious Studies Theory
and First Amendment Law .................................................................. 226
E. Church Autonomy ..................................................................................... 230
F. Group Rights to Native American Religious Freedom
as a Hybrid Bundle of Rights ............................................................... 235
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS
FOR C OLLECTIVE NATIVE AMERICAN R ELIGION .................................... 236
A. Legislative Accommodations ................................................................... 236
B. The Federal Trust Responsibility and Cultural/Religious Rights ...... 237
C. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978)............................ 240
D. A Finer-Grained Reading of AIRFA ....................................................... 242
E. AIRFA’s 1994 Peyote Amendment .......................................................... 246
F. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990) ...... 248
G. NAGPRA in the Courts: “Religion” v. Science” ................................... 251
H. NAGPRA: A Finer-Grained Reading ..................................................... 252

* John M. and Elizabeth W. Musser Professor of Religious Studies, Carleton College.
Thanks to Kevin Washburn, James Boyd White, Kristen Carpenter, Colette Routel, Noah
Salomon, Greg Johnson, Suzan Harjo, Carla Fredericks, Steve Moore, and the thoughtful
editors at BYU Law Review. Support for the writing of this Article was provided under a
2017–18 Guggenheim Fellowship and a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer
Stipend (Award FT-254559-17). A forthcoming book elaborates on the concerns of this
Article. See MICHAEL D. MCNALLY, DEFEND THE SACRED: NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Princeton U. Press, forthcoming 2020).

205

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/13/19 10:16 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

III. JUDICIAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL
NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXERCISE .............................................. 253
A. Eagle Act Accommodations ..................................................................... 254
B. United States v. Hardman and United States v. Wilgus....................... 259
C. Courts Recognizing Collective Rights to Native Religions ................. 266
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ...................................................................... 271
V. BURWELL V . HOBBY LOBBY STORES , INC . (2014) ............................................ 275
A. RFRA’s Expansive Reach in Hobby Lobby ............................................ 276
B. Substantial Burdens in the Wake of Hobby Lobby ............................... 280
C. Whither the RFRA Claim in Standing Rock II? ..................................... 282
D. Hobby Lobby and Collective Rights ....................................................... 286
CONCLUSION : THE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
OF NATIVE AMERICAN R ELIGIOUS F REEDOM ......................................... 288

INTRODUCTION: THE STRENGTH OF STANDING ROCK
AND THE WEAKNESS OF THE LAW
The 2016–17 encampment at Standing Rock, North Dakota has
put on public display the impressive strength and ongoing vitality
of traditional Native American religions, not to mention the
spiritual grounding and rhetorical force of their resolve to defend
the sacred. But intensive coverage has also put on display just how
weak the legal remedies available to Native people are as they seek
to defend sacred lands and waters.1 In addition to the proposed
pipeline’s endangerment of drinking water by crossing the
Missouri River a half mile upstream from the reservation
boundary, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe cited concerns about the
pipeline’s desecration of a veritable sacred district of gravesites,
stone rings designating Lakota ancestral knowledge, Sitting Bull’s
traditional encampment, and the holy confluence of the Cannonball
River and the Missouri. The enormous eddy that formed in Spring
at this confluence fashioned large spherical sacred stones (hence
Cannonball) until the Army Corps of Engineers built an enormous
dam forming Lake Oahe.

1. For a discussion of how the Dakota Access Pipeline controversy exposes the
weakness of treaty claims, see Carla F. Fredericks & Jesse D. Heibel, Standing Rock, the Sioux
Treaties, and the Limits of the Supremacy Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 477 (2018).
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The processes for tribal consultation and public consideration
of adverse effects on cultural resources like sacred sites (and natural
resources like water that are also cultural resources) ostensibly
safeguarded by historical preservation and environmental law
turned out, in this case, to be hoops to jump through, and the
broader purposes of which can easily be exploited by prodevelopment environmental consultants, corporations, and
agencies. One need not be a specialist to sense something amiss
when, on July 16, 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers issued its
formal “Finding of No Significant Impact” for the crossing of the
Missouri. This finding formally concluded the review necessary
under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) without a fuller
Environmental Impact Statement process that NEPA requires when
a federal action is more consequential for the human environment.2
Playing the few legal cards available to it under NHPA, NEPA, and
other laws relating to federal permitting of the crossing of
waterways,3 the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe failed to persuade a
federal court to issue a preliminary injunction blocking approval of
the pipeline’s crossing of the Missouri River at Lake Oahe.4 Despite
considerable available evidence that the Army Corps’ consultation
with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe fell short of standards set by
Congress,5 and standard practice in the Obama Administration6
and clarified in the courts,7 the judge found the claims insufficient
for a preliminary injunction.8
But the three federal agencies involved with the Dakota Access
Pipeline approval immediately issued a halt to construction
pending further review. And in December 2016, the Army Corps

2. National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101 et seq., especially § 306108
(1966); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–35 (1969).
3. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403 (2012).
4. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Standing Rock I), 205 F.
Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016).
5. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a–et seq., amended by 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470a(d), 470w(4) (1994); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012)
(amended 1994); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) .
6. See Letters from the Advisory Council for Historic Pres. to Jo-Ellen Darcy, U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs (May 19, 2016, Aug. 19, 2016).
7. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. Standing Rock I, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4.
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denied the remaining easement for the Missouri River crossing
until alternatives were considered under an Environmental Impact
Statement process, an action which drew the pipeline company’s
lawsuit challenging the decision. When President Trump took the
reins of power, he issued a directive on day two of his
administration for the Army Corps to grant the necessary easement
and to expedite completion of the Dakota Access Pipeline. A range
of challenges to Trump’s directive in courts have extended the legal
process through the time of this writing and will extend into the
future. Whatever the final outcome, the Standing Rock/Dakota
Access story begs a question: Why—and how—should Native
peoples boldly perform prayer, ceremony, and encampment itself
as protest, with the world watching and admiring their spiritual
resolve, and not have any meaningful recourse under religious
freedom law? Why, in other words, are we even talking about the
legal weeds of environmental and historic preservation law and not
about what many consider the American first freedom?
The answer to the why of the question is the starting point for
this Article, but I will make quick work of it: Native American
claims to sacred lands have consistently failed in the courts, either
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or under its
statutory counterpart, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(1993).9 Indeed, Standing Rock’s downstream neighbor, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, failed to block the Dakota Access
Pipeline’s completion with a religious freedom claim that was too
little and too late to effect a preliminary injunction, since the district
court judge found the religious freedom claims were nullified by a
laches determination, and in any event unlikely to succeed on the
merits, given the difficulty of establishing a substantial burden on
religious exercise in sacred land case law.10
My answer to the how entails a more complex consideration of
the distinctive contours of Native American religions as they relate,

9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)
[hereinafter RFRA]. On the First Amendment, see Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d
1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
On RFRA, see Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556
U.S. 1281 (2009).
10. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Standing Rock II), 239 F.
Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017). For fuller treatment, see infra note 287.
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or not, to the legal conceptualization of religion. The distinctiveness
of Native religions has mattered not simply insofar as they are landbased, a point that has been made often, and well. More
elementally, I will argue, what distinguishes Native religions and
such legal claims to traditional religions like those of the Standing
Rock Lakota/Dakota is that they are collective in shape.
Like so many begged questions, the one raised at Standing
Rock is also a rhetorical one, and I will argue in this Article for
an approach to the collective rights of Native American
religious claims.
Because religious liberty protections have so often failed in the
courts to deliver meaningful protections to distinctive Native
American religious traditions, Native communities and their
advocates have looked beyond the First Amendment and religious
freedom law to accommodations under either federal Indian law,
or under federal Indian law in concert with other legal regimes,
such as historic preservation, environmental law, or Native specific
statutes like the Native American Grave Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).11 “Religion” has often been seen as a
category too closely associated with the process of colonization and
dispossession to meaningfully, much less legally, encompass the
full reach or get at the thick weave of indigenous practices, beliefs,
lifeways, and land relationships that are shot through with the
religious without being solely, or plainly, religious. “We don’t have
a religion; we have a way of life,” is a maxim often heard in Indian
country. What is more, the growing momentum of legal discourses
of tribal sovereignty, on the one hand, and of the rights of
indigenous peoples in international law, on the other, have folded
rights to “religion” into broader political and cultural rights to
peoplehood. This is all to the good.
But a reluctance to speak of Native traditions in the language of
religion has produced its own difficulties. The preferred everyday
parlance of Native “spirituality” over “religion,” or the legal
parlance of “cultural resource” or “traditional cultural property”
over “sacred site,” can and does come at considerable expense to
the protection of sacred places, practices, objects, and remains. For

11. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
13 (2012).
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“religion,” notwithstanding its indeterminacy, remains a powerful
category word by virtue of its place in the U.S. Constitution and in
discourses of American national identity. Native advocates have
long understood a doubleness of religious freedom discourse: its
power to exclude them from, say, sacred land protection together
with the generative power of an appeal to religious freedom in
getting accommodations and even legislation like NAGPRA
through legislatures despite being fewer than two percent of
the population.12
In what follows, I argue that religious rights protections for
Native American places, practices, objects, and ancestral remains,
can be understood more properly as collective rights of Native
communities rather than as the private conscience rights of so many
Native individuals. What I propose is an approach to Native
American religious claims that aligns and conjoins such claims with
elements of federal Indian law and with the emerging norms of
indigenous rights in international human rights law. Oriented by
theoretical insights from my field of religious studies, my argument
draws on a critical reading of recent discussions in religious
freedom law about group rights, but especially on federal Indian
law’s elaboration of the special government-to-government
relationship with Native American communities as collectivities,
and what courts have identified as collective rights to religion
under accommodations in the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act.13 If religious freedom arguments are read in light of these
multiple sources of authority, rather than merely as making
reference to religious freedom law, they may not be the non-starters
that the signal decisions on Native American religious freedom
made by the Supreme Court suggest to be the case.14 In this regard,
12. From the time that followers of the Peyote Way incorporated as the Native
American Church and Pueblo leaders appealed to religious freedom to preserve ceremonial
feast dances in the 1920s, Native leaders have understood both the value and costs of
articulating their practices and beliefs in the category of religion. See, e.g., THOMAS
CONSTANTINE MAROUKIS, THE PEYOTE ROAD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NATIVE
AMERICAN CHURCH (2010); TISA WENGER, WE HAVE A RELIGION: THE 1920S PUEBLO INDIAN
DANCE CONTROVERSY AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2009).
13. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (2012)
(amended 1962).
14. See RFRA §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng, 485 U.S.
439; Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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I aim to suggest the promise of more intellectual commerce
between the disparate fields of federal Indian law and religious
freedom law.15
I am emboldened to make this argument, on the one hand, by
my training in academic religious studies, a field whose critical turn
has made it more keenly aware of the constructed, contested, and
malleable nature of the category of religion, and by extension, the
discourse of religious freedom. Religious studies scholars have also
unearthed how that discourse has historically privileged the rights
of some religious people over others, particularly along the lines of
the individual right in contrast to the collective tradition. And, to
be sure, scholarship on Native American religious traditions in
particular takes pains to point out the often irreducibly collective
nature of Native American religious claims. As the Lakota scholar
Vine Deloria, Jr. famously wrote, “there is no salvation in tribal
religions apart from the continuance of the tribe itself.”16
If what counts as religion is not given but arrived at through
processes of deliberation and constellations of power that make
some voices more authoritative than others, one time-honored axis
along which this deliberation has aligned is the question of
whether, as Durkheim famously argued, the sacred is an eminently
social thing17 or whether, following Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, or
William James, it is elementally a matter of subjective experience.18

15. There has been surprisingly little intellectual commerce between the field of
federal Indian law and that of religious freedom law. This is curious because key decisions
shaping First Amendment Free Exercise interpretation in recent memory, especially Smith
but also Roy and Lyng that led up to Smith, concern Native American religions—a
correspondence that often goes unnoticed. It is curious also because much of the case law
that has given shape to federal Indian law has concerned a profound indigenous regard for
place, peoplehood, and lifeways, the urgency of which is as much spiritual or religious as it
is economic or political.
16. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 196 (2007). As legal
scholar Alex Tallchief Skibine puts it, the importance of sacred sites “is less about individual
spiritual development and more about the continuing existence of Indians as a tribal people.”
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred
Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 273 (2012).
17. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Carol Cosman
trans., 2008) (1912).
18. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION
(Willard R. Trask trans., Harcourt Inc. 1959) (1957); RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION
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If the latter cluster of viewpoints has generally carried the day in
American legal interpretations of religion’s definition, there is
anything but a consensus among religious studies scholars that
religion is, at base, a matter of private conscience or subjective
experience—indeed there may just be consensus that it is, at base,
a social phenomenon.
On the other hand, I am emboldened to make this argument by
the confluence of four distinct legal developments. First, the
Supreme Court’s 2014 holding in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
that for-profit corporations are considered persons with protectable
religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), makes clear that the legal reach of religious freedom is
hardly constrained by the conventional wisdom that America’s first
freedom is keyed in the liberal vein to an individual’s conscience
alone.19 Given the highly charged political climate of Hobby Lobby’s
challenge to the Affordable Care Act, this may seem like an outlier
or splitting of hairs, but the decision does suggest a development
in a long history of religious freedom decisions that have cautiously
engaged the rights of religious groups as groups. Indeed, a close
reading of Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 and a number of other cases,
suggests that the Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby is no such outlier,
and this can help frame a rethinking of what courts have done to
flatten collective Native American claims in Lyng v. Northwest
Cemetery Protective Ass’n21 and the Ninth Circuit’s 2008 ruling in
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service.22
Second, legislative and administrative accommodations for
Native American religions based on treaty relationships and the
legal doctrine of federal trust responsibility, even those that extend
to preserve and protect the religions, cultures, and languages of
TO THE RATIONAL (John W. Harvey trans., 1958) (1917); WILLIAM JAMES,
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE (1985).

THE VARIETIES OF

19. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see RFRA, §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4.
20. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
21. Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
22. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556
U.S. 1281 (2009). This is, to be sure, not entirely intuitive. Indeed, courts have begun to apply
other elements of Hobby Lobby to Native American religious freedom claims in a manner that
does not lean toward this particular outcome. See, e.g., Oklevueha Native American Church
of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016). See infra note 277.
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recognized Native communities, are based on the structure of
nation-to-nation regard for the political status of tribes. An inquiry
into the case law concerning a Native American religious
accommodation to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
suggests how effectual this view has been for religious rights of
tribes.23 In the Eagle Act accommodation cases, courts have
recognized the priority of protections resting on this distinctive
basis over the religious freedom rights of individuals, including
Native American individuals.
Third, even if First Amendment and RFRA jurisprudence has
largely confirmed the individual rights basis of religious freedom
in findings against tribal claims, in a number of arenas, courts have
made increasingly consistent use of a distinction between
individual claims and what we might identify as the hybrid claims
of collectives.
Fourth, there have been important developments in clarifying
indigenous rights within international human rights law. The 2007
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
affirmed with reservations by the United States in 2010, clarifies
how recognized international human rights protections, including
religious rights, must be regarded in terms of collective, and not
simply individual, rights, if they are to extend equally and justly to
indigenous peoples and people.24
A. Structure of Argument
The structure of the Article roughly follows this sequence in the
argument. The first Part considers a consistent judicial
misrecognition of Native American religious freedom claims to
sacred lands heretofore as those merely of individual practitioners,
through a consideration of major First Amendment cases and those
weighing the corresponding statutory protections of the RFRA.
This Part also examines contemporary discussions of an
institutional turn in religious freedom law to help suggest that the
judicial misrecognition is not inevitable in religious freedom law.
The second Part considers the shape of legislative
accommodations specific to Native American communities under

23. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668(d) (2012).
24. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
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statutes like the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA),
NAGPRA, and a number of administrative accommodations. In
this Part, I argue that these statutes and regulations are properly
understood as clarifications that religious accommodations for
Native communities will conform more to the collective contours
of federal Indian law than to the individual conscience contours of
religious freedom law.
The third Part considers how courts have recognized the often
collective shape to Native claims under such Native specific
legislative and administrative religious accommodations,
especially those under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.
The fourth Part considers how a more consistent approach to
Native American religious freedom in the register of collective
rights conforms to emerging norms of international law spelled out
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.25
The fifth and final Part concludes that an elaboration of the
group rights of Native American religious freedom can draw
support from the Supreme Court’s 2014 recognition, in Hobby
Lobby, that religious liberty rights can pertain to certain kinds
of collectivities.
I owe a particular debt here to the work of Kristen Carpenter,
who argues that, in American Indian religious freedom cases,
courts worried about potential “slippery slopes” of concern in other
minority religious freedom cases consistently overlook the internal
“limiting principles” of indigenous religions that accompany
virtually any claims that Native communities qua communities
make, thus exaggerating the potentially unlimited nature of
individual claims.26 Carpenter views as a welcome development
legislative and administrative accommodations in the wake of
failed religious freedom claims in the courts, but she observes
that such accommodations are always balanced against a range
of other, often very powerful, non-Indian stakeholder interests.27

25. Id.
26. Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American

Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387 (2012) [hereinafter Carpenter, Limiting
Principles]; Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property,
118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009); see also Skibine, supra note 16.
27. Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 26, at 436–76.
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With a general preference for the nation-to-nation and
consultative model over that of the legislative-administrative
accommodations model, together with a strong argument for the
cultural property rights of tribes to sacred places, Carpenter
implies, but does not expressly argue, that Native claims under the
broader religious freedom protections of the First Amendment,
RFRA, and RLUIPA, can and ought to be viewed in light of their
collective nature.
In these pages, I wish to build on and extend Carpenter’s work,
to argue that Native religious freedom claims can gain further
traction under the protections of the First Amendment, RFRA, and
RLUIPA if those claims are construed as not merely individuals
asserting rights of conscience but as collective rights. Of course,
prevailing political theory in the liberal tradition, and not
surprisingly most First Amendment jurisprudence, regards
religious freedom, like the right to free speech, expression, and
even assembly, as a right of individual citizens. But as a number of
religious liberty scholars have argued, there are some compelling
ways to think of the religious liberty of groups.28
B. Timeliness of Argument in Light of Hobby Lobby
My argument draws sustenance as well from the Supreme
Court’s 2014 ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., recognizing the
religious freedom rights of a closely held for-profit corporation in
its challenge to the contraceptive coverage mandate of the
Affordable Care Act.29 Importantly, the Court recognized the
religious freedom of the corporation itself, a form of collective right
expressly distinguished from the religious freedom rights of its
aggregate members.30 The Supreme Court’s approach to RFRA in
Hobby Lobby as a bold extension beyond the Court’s jurisprudence
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, together with
its finding that closely held corporations have religious freedom
rights, are departures that very well could carry some significant
implications for courts’ future reckoning with religious freedom
claims by Native American communities, not simply as

28. See infra note 80.
29. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
30. Id.
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aggregations of individuals or as analogues to religious
congregations, but as forms of collective organization.
Although the Hobby Lobby majority insisted otherwise, it was a
holding of what Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, called “startling
breadth” in terms of its recognition of RFRA’s expansive reach.31
That breadth, that departure, is seen keenly when juxtaposed to a
weighty appellate court decision that RFRA did not protect the
claims of six American Indian nations to a sacred mountain, despite
a district court holding in a different circuit that did find a RFRA
protection for sacred lands.32
In Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service (The San Francisco
Peaks Case), 2008, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, overrode its
three-judge-panel decision to affirm federal approval of a scheme
to spray treated sewage effluent from the City of Flagstaff as
artificial snow to enhance recreational skiing on Arizona’s San
Francisco Peaks, despite the claims by the Navajo, Hopi, and four
other tribes that in thus desecrating their holy mountain, the Forest
Service would violate their religious freedom rights under RFRA.33
The Ninth Circuit majority indicated its holding did not question
the sincerity of the asserted religious convictions or the ill effects of
the sewage-to-snowmaking scheme that native practitioners would
“feel,” but in a decision that had plenty to say about the nature of
religion, the Ninth Circuit distinguished diminished “spiritual
fulfillment” from a “substantial burden” on “religious exercise”
under RFRA.
To settle the proper interpretation of “substantial burden”
under the statute, the legal question at issue in the case, the Ninth
Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s 1988 holding in Lyng v.
Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass’n, which found no First
Amendment violation of the religious freedom of three California
tribes when the U.S. Forest Service approved a logging road
through a sacred precinct necessary for cosmic renewal
ceremonies.34 The High Court in Lyng took pains to acknowledge

31. Id. at 739 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556

U.S. 1281 (2009); Comanche Nation v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla. 2008).
33. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058.
34. Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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both the sincerity of the tribal claims and to acknowledge the road
would surely cause “spiritual disquiet,” but found no prohibition
of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment because the
government action had not coerced practitioners to depart from
their religion.35
Although the facts aligned—tribal sacred land claims on public
lands—the Ninth Circuit dissent in the San Francisco Peaks Case took
issue with whether Lyng should be controlling for an interpretation
of RFRA, given Congress’s concerns in enacting RFRA in the first
place. Be that as it may, I take the two cases as a starting point for
this analysis because both decisions involve tribes as litigants and
accept the factual findings about the sincerity and shape of the
collective religious obligations and ceremonial duties on those
sacred places. But in their conclusions, both cases flatten those
collective claims on the one hand, into claims about spirituality of
individual practitioners, and on the other project those specific
claims into a potential slippery slope of idiosyncratic challenges by
individuals claiming Native American religion as the basis for any
number of claims. Despite a more expansive interpretation of
Congress’s intent in RFRA on the matter in question in the Tenth
Circuit,36 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the San Francisco
Peaks Case, and Native efforts to protect access and integrity of
sacred places on public lands have since struggled to gain traction
in U.S. courts.37
In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court did offer a
considerably more expansive interpretation of RFRA. There, the
Court held that Congress, in RFRA, intended to include closely held
for-profit corporations in its definition of “persons” capable of
protected “religious exercise.”38 In Hobby Lobby, the Court found
that the protected religious exercise in question was that of the
closely held private corporation, one with over 13,000 employees,
and not simply the individual members of the Green family who
operate the corporation in a manner consistent with their
evangelical Christian beliefs.

35. Id. at 452.
36. Comanche Nation, 393 F. Supp.2d 1196.
37. See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Standing Rock

II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017).
38. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014).
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Although the two sacred lands cases and Hobby Lobby’s
challenge to the Affordable Care Act present issues that are hardly
identical, the contrast in the Court’s findings about the relevance of
RFRA is striking. This goes to the heart of a double standard—not
simply an intellectual difficulty with the distinctive contours of
Native American religions but a consistent and thorough
misrecognition of Native claims to protect sacred places, practices,
objects, ancestral remains, and other elements of cultural heritage.
I. JUDICIAL MISRECOGNITION OF NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS
As the dissenting opinions in both Lyng and the San Francisco
Peaks Case make plain, courts have clearly not fully understood the
distinctive facets of Native American religions, especially religious
relationships to land. It is not easy to shoehorn the distinctive traits
of Native American traditions of sacred land, peoplehood, and
ways of life into the category of religion as it has been
conventionally understood in the West and conceptually bounded
in the discourses of the law. Native religions are many, not one,
often with widely divergent beliefs even in one community. They
are decidedly oral. They are oriented toward sacred lands in ways
that defy most Christian analogies. They are integrated with other,
less visibly religious, aspects of lifeways where the “sacred” is not
clearly set apart from “profane” matters of economic livelihood or
political organization. Religious beliefs and practices are often
markedly local, rather than generally universal propositions
disaggregated from everyday life on a particular landscape—no
one tries to convert you to the Lakota religion, for example. Native
religious freedom claims have typically involved forcibly
-interrupted traditions, and efforts to renew those traditions
have often prompted challenges to their “authenticity.” Indeed,
there is considerable legal literature that takes note of these
distinctive contours.39
39. See, e.g., LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW

MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES (2002); HUSTON SMITH, A SEAT AT
NATIVE AMERICANS ON RELIGIOUS
Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation:
Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145 (1996);
IN THE

THE TABLE: HUSTON SMITH IN CONVERSATION WITH
FREEDOM (Phil Cousineau ed., 2006); Dean B. Suagee,
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I contend, however, that these intellectual difficulties are not
driving the contrast between judicial interpretation of RFRA in the
San Francisco Peaks Case and in Hobby Lobby. The driving issue, I
believe, is a reluctance to reckon more fully with the collective
nature of most Native religious freedom claims. Even Judge
Fletcher’s dissent in the San Francisco Peaks Case and Justice
Brennan’s in Lyng, for all their spirited chastening of the
fundamental misunderstanding of the workings of Native
American religious claims to sacred lands, fail to address the
collective nature of the claimants themselves. Tribes, not individual
practitioners, and collective obligations, not individual piety, form
the basis of the claims.
A. First Amendment
The two key Supreme Court decisions on Native religious
practice have been flagship cases by which the Rehnquist Court
contained the reach, generally, of the First Amendment’s free
exercise protection. In its 1988 decision in Lyng v. Northwest
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the High Court upheld Forest Service
approval of a logging road through California high country
considered to be a sacred precinct to several Native nations.40
The Supreme Court granted the sincerity of Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa beliefs about the high country, but reasoned that no
religious exercise was unconstitutionally burdened by the
government action.41
The Supreme Court built on Lyng in the 1990 case Employment
Division v. Smith, where it found no First Amendment violation in
the denial of unemployment benefits to two chemical dependency
counselors fired for their involvement in the Native American
Church.42 This was despite broad recognition in the courts of the
Peyote Way as a bona fide religion and, in the case of the
respondents in Smith, as a keystone of their own sobriety.43

Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural Conflict
over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757 (2001).
40. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439.
41. Id. at 449–50.
42. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
43. Id.
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Although a century of efforts in legislatures and courts had secured
a solid recognition of the Native American Church as a disciplined
moral tradition that involved sacramental ingestion of peyote, the
Court transformed forty thousand devout practitioners of the
Peyote Way into felons overnight.44 The Smith decision is known
for nullifying First Amendment challenges to “neutral laws of
general applicability,” even when a government action has the
effect of prohibiting religious exercise.45 Lyng and Smith not only
settled the particular questions at hand; they also foreclosed
countless other Native American cases that might have come before
courts. Native communities were not alone in their concern with
the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith. First
Amendment and religious organizations spanning the entire
culture-wars spectrum came together and pressed Congress for a
response to Smith, which they attained in the 1993 Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). However, the broad coalition
that pressed for RFRA decidedly left the Native peyotist practices
specifically at issue in Smith out of the statutory rejoinder to the
decision, no doubt concerned that trying to right the particular
wrong about the Peyote Way would jeopardize the coalition. As
discussed below, Peyote Way practitioners secured their own
statutory protections one year later, and the difference between
RFRA and that result, an amendment to the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), is crucial to my purposes.46
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In RFRA, Congress expressly sought to restore what the
Supreme Court in Smith had taken away: the application of judicial
strict scrutiny to government actions, including neutral, generally
applicable ones, that substantially burden religious exercise. The
return to Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to Smith restores
judicial interpretation of compelling state interest as “only those
interests of the highest order.”47

44.
45.
46.
47.
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See infra note 140.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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The Supreme Court returned the volley four years later, finding
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states.48 This prompted a
number of state legislatures to enact their own RFRA statutes, and
Congress itself passed the more narrowly tailored Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000. Among
other things, RLUIPA included an amendment to RFRA’s
definition of “religious exercise,” more expansively including “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.”49 The Supreme Court affirmed RFRA’s
constitutionality with respect to federal laws in Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006), suggesting RFRA held
considerable promise for Native American religious challenges to
the many federal actions regulating their lives.50
But even with the leg up offered by RFRA and the even more
expansive definition of religious exercise included in RLUIPA,
Native claims to sacred land protection under RFRA have generally
failed because they have been largely foreclosed by the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in the San Francisco Peaks Case. There, the Ninth
Circuit found that federal approval of an Arizona ski resort’s plan
to spray artificial snow made with treated sewage effluent did not
“substantially burden” the religious exercise of the Navajo, Hopi,
and other tribes who regard the San Francisco Peaks as a sacred
mountain.51 The Ninth Circuit accepted ninety-odd detailed factual
findings about the complex religious practices and beliefs
associated with the San Francisco Peaks massif. Some of those
beliefs, like Navajo concerns about contamination from water that
had been in contact with the dead discharged from mortuaries and
hospitals, were impervious to assurances of the purity of the water
48. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
49. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc

-5 (2018).
50. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
51. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir., 2008), cert. denied, 556
U.S. 1281 (2009). An alternative finding by a lower court within the Tenth Circuit appealed
to that circuit’s RFRA precedent and expressly rejected the government’s request to invoke
the Ninth Circuit interpretation of substantial burden in Navajo Nation. It found a RFRA
substantial burden because the development of a building at Fort Sill would obstruct a
traditional view of Medicine Bluffs, a sacred site to the Comanche, and would significantly
inhibit the “spiritual experience” of tribal members. Comanche Nation v. United States, 393 F.
Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D, Okla. 2008). Still, as of this writing, no appellate court has risen to
challenge the Ninth Circuit’s view in Navajo Nation that tribes have no viable RFRA claims
for threatened sacred sites.
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measured in terms of parts per million. But the en banc majority
determined that religious exercise was not “substantially
burdened” under a narrow interpretation of what Congress meant
by substantial burden in its passage of RFRA. The Ninth Circuit
rejected a broader construal urged by the tribes in the case and
engaged by the Tenth Circuit, and viewed “substantial burden” as
a term of art referencing the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith First
Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit majority
applied the Court’s interpretation of “burden” from the Lyng
decision—which of course involved claims under the First
Amendment, not under RFRA—but which was found to be a
controlling pre-Smith decision. This view prevailed over the
argument that Lyng, cited centrally in Smith just two years later,
was tantamount to the Smith jurisprudence that RFRA was clearly
enacted to address. Instead of finding that religious exercise was
substantially burdened, the Ninth Circuit found that merely the
possibilities for “spiritual fulfillment” were “diminished.”52
One could rightly argue that the transmutation of religious
exercise into spiritual fulfillment is precisely what is likely to
happen when complex land-based and intrinsically collective
Native American traditions are assimilated conceptually within a
discourse of religious freedom that naturalizes and universalizes
Protestant Christian traditions of the interior, subjective and
unmediated relationship between the faithful individual and God.
If this is true, then the San Francisco Peaks Case, especially given the
Supreme Court’s consideration and rejection of a petition for
appeal, is perhaps a final nail in the coffin. As Judge Fletcher wrote
in the Ninth Circuit’s original three-judge-panel ruling for the
tribes, effectively drawing a line in the sand:
The Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise claim in part because
it could not see a stopping place. If Appellants do not have a valid
RFRA claim in this case, we are unable to see how any Native
American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA claim based
on beliefs and practices tied to land that they hold sacred.53

52. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. 3d at 1063.
53. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d in

part en banc., 535 F. 3d. 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
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C. “Native Spirituality” and the Subversion of Religious Freedom
in Lyng and Navajo Nation
Other scholars have provided extensive analyses of the Lyng
decision from a variety of important critical perspectives,54 and
elsewhere I provide a more detailed analysis of the workings of the
discourse of spirituality in the San Francisco Peaks Case.55 Here, I will
only observe that while the First Amendment claims in Lyng and
the RFRA claims in the San Francisco Peaks Case were those of tribes
to sacred lands with attendant collective religious duties and
obligations, the Supreme Court in Lyng and the Ninth Circuit in
the San Francisco Peaks Case flattened those collective claims into
those of so many individuals exercising a kind of
protean “spirituality.”
The provenance of this judicial analysis harks back to the Lyng
majority’s turn to a controlling, if only loosely related, 1986
Supreme Court decision. In Bowen v. Roy, the High Court found that
a government requirement of a Social Security number for access to
social services did not violate the religious freedom of an individual
who claimed, as a matter of Native American religious belief, that
having such a number would harm the spirit of his child.56 While
Lyng, like Roy, involved Native American religious claims, the
analogical alignment that the Lyng majority saw in the two cases is
dubious. Roy involved the claims of an individual, one with few
connections to Native communities or teachings established by
Native communities; Lyng involved tribal governments
connecting religiously necessary collective obligations to a
specific sacred place.
The courts took pains not to dispute the sincerity of the
religious claims involved, but the Lyng and Navajo Nation courts
viewed those claims as matters of subjective feeling, and the effect
of the government actions as only matters of “diminished spiritual

54. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases:
Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005); Skibine, supra note 16;
Vogel, supra note 39.
55. Michael D. McNally, From Substantial Burden on Religion to Diminished Spiritual
Fulfillment: The San Francisco Peaks Case and the Misunderstanding of Native American Religion,
30 J.L. & RELIGION 36 (2015).
56. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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fulfillment.” Even the spirited dissent by Justice Brennan in Lyng57
and the lengthy, elaborately substantiated dissent by Judge Fletcher
in Navajo Nation, for all their concern that the majorities had entirely
misunderstood the nature and reach of Native American religions,
did not challenge the underlying definitional assumption that
religion is, in essence, a subjective matter.58 Citing William James’s
definition of religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of
individual men [and women] in their solitude, so far as they
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may
consider the divine,” Judge Fletcher asserts “[r]eligious exercise
sometimes involves physical things, but the physical or scientific
character of these things is secondary to their spiritual and religious
meaning. The centerpiece of religious belief and exercise is the
‘subjective’ and the ‘spiritual.’”59 Fletcher’s view surely pertains to
many contemporary religious phenomena, but, as I discuss below,
religious studies scholars would hardly content themselves with
such a view of an essence or even a thus configured “centerpiece”
of religion.
More insidious still in these two cases is the slippage from the
language of religion to a language of spirituality, and specifically
nature spirituality, which is ineluctably subjective in mode, protean
in texture, and in the case of claims to “sacred lands,” oriented
toward “nature” in general rather than involving highly specific
duties, obligations, and regulations with regard to highly specific
places. Title I of the Navajo Nation’s own legal code codifies respect
toward San Francisco Peaks and the other holy mountains that
define Navajo land.60 But the Ninth Circuit majority could only see

57. Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the majority had fundamentally
misunderstood the idioms of Native religions. He doubted that the Native people would
“derive any solace from the knowledge that although the practice of their religion will
become ‘more difficult’ as a result of the Government’s actions, they remain free to maintain
their religious beliefs.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 477
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). “Given today’s ruling,” Justice Brennan continued, “that
freedom amounts to nothing more than the right to believe that their religion will be
destroyed.” Id.
58. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 470–71, 474–77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1096 (9th Cir., 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009).
59. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d at 1096 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31–32 (1929)).
60. Navajo Nation Code Ann. tit. 1, § 205 (B)–(D) (2010).
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the accepted factual findings before it as constituting a nebulous
mountain piety, one that had arguably been facilitated, in terms of
access, by the ski resort’s improvements.61 To inform its contention
that Native claims to “spiritual fulfillment” would have no
stopping place, the Ninth Circuit majority noted that the Coconino
National Forest in question involves “approximately a dozen”
mountains sacred to various tribes, as well as other landscapes
“such as canyons and canyon systems, rivers and river drainages,
lakes, discrete mesas and buttes, rock formations, shrines,
gathering areas, pilgrimage routes, and prehistoric sites.”62 The
district court’s factual findings in the case included a finding that
the White Mountain Apaches, one of the plaintiff tribes, had made
snow at Sunrise, a ski area they operate on a mountain on their
reservation, with water from a lake that includes discharged treated
wastewater.63 The district court judge hastened to observe that one
witness testified that Apaches held the entire White Mountain
reservation to be sacred, and also that the ski area was one of the
two major ski areas in Arizona and potentially in competition
with the Snowbowl on San Francisco Peaks.64 Thus conflating all
mountains and all landscapes as sacred to the White Mountain
Apaches, and blending all the complicated distinctions in belief
and practice made by a sophisticated religious tradition into a
single claim of Native spirituality that all nature is sacred, and
hinting that some claims could be opportunistic or disingenuous,
the district court could impugn the full reach of the burden on
religion by the San Francisco Peaks Case.65
In a telling, footnoted exchange with the dissent on the question
of the subjective nature of religion, the Ninth Circuit
majority wrote:
For all of the rich complexity that describes the profound
integration of man and mountain into one, the burden of the
recycled wastewater can only be expressed by the Plaintiffs as
damaged spiritual feelings. Under Supreme Court precedent,

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d at 1066 n.7.
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 897–98 (D. Ariz. 2006).
Id. at 898.
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d at 1066.
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government action that diminishes subjective spiritual fulfillment
does not ‘substantially burden’ religion.66

In the case of Lyng, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion
expressed a related concern about a slippery slope: if the Court
recognized any one First Amendment claim to a sacred site by
peoples deemed to regard everything as sacred, where would the
subsequent claims end? “However much we might wish that it
were otherwise,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “government simply
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s
religious needs and desires.”67 “Spiritual fulfillment” as a species
of religious exercise can be hindered without violating the
Constitution, a potentiality that cannot serviceably define the
realm of religious freedom protection because it implies no
stopping place.
D. Religion as a Collective Category: Religious Studies Theory
and First Amendment Law
A second development that emboldens the argument that
Native religious claims should be considered assertions of
collective rights is the recent critical turn in my own field, religious
studies, and the lens this critical turn offers for interpreting some
moments in formative judicial decisions on First Amendment
religious freedom claims. For while the prevailing view of the First
Amendment sees its religious rights as consisting chiefly of the
inviolability of individual conscience as a tenet of liberal political
philosophy, it does not comport with the best of religious studies
thinking. Neither is it an unambiguous view of the First
Amendment religion clauses, as a range of religious freedom
scholars have increasingly argued in recent decades. I turn now to
some core debates within the study of religion which, by their very
presence, should make quick work of the intellectual surety of the
often-implicit judicial pronouncements on the nature of religion.
Although scholars of religion for at least a century have not
been able to agree on precisely what religion is, one thing most
contemporary scholars of religion agree upon is that one cannot
take as given what religion is. Especially in the last fifty years, the
66. Id. at 1070 n.12.
67. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
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field of religious studies has organized itself as a conversation
around the constructed nature of the category of religion. The
eminent University of Chicago scholar, Jonathan Z. Smith, put the
matter this way:
[W]hile there is a staggering amount of data, of phenomena, of
human experiences and expressions that might be characterized
in one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as
religious—there is no data for religion. Religion is solely the
creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s
analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison
and generalization.68

But the critical turn has extended beyond merely disclosing the
making of “religion” as a category and raised awareness of how
that making has served ongoing European and American projects
of colonization and imperialism abroad and Protestant hegemony
at home.69 Scholars whose reference points for the negotiation of
religious difference extend beyond the modern West to Islamic
societies remind us of how culturally specific the liberal secularism
touted as universal is and how many other discursive alternatives
to “religious freedom” have addressed questions of religious
diversity within a common polity.70
Religious studies scholars have in recent decades turned critical
attention to the historical emergence of the category of “religion”
and its corollary, “religions.” Arguing not only that there is no
“given” category of religion, much less a settled definition of such
a given category, a position made some time ago by Wilfred
Cantwell Smith, these scholars describe the “production” of the
category and its uses in the dense social, economic, and political
contexts of the West’s colonialization and empire.71 Emerging from

68. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN at xi
(1982) (emphasis omitted).
69. See, e.g., TOMOKO MASUZAWA, THE INVENTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS: OR, HOW
EUROPEAN UNIVERSALISM WAS PRESERVED IN THE LANGUAGE OF PLURALISM (2005); RUSSELL
T. MCCUTCHEON, MANUFACTURING RELIGION: THE DISCOURSE ON SUI GENERIS RELIGION AND
THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA (1997); ROBERT A. ORSI, BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH: THE
RELIGIOUS WORLDS PEOPLE MAKE AND THE SCHOLARS WHO STUDY THEM (2005).
70. See TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER
IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (2009); SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL
AND THE FEMINIST SUBJECT (2005).
71. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION (1963).
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Protestant theology and encounters with “world religions,” earlier
generations of religious studies scholars regarded differences
between traditions as the distinctive phenomena of a universal panhuman category of religion; the process of defining “religion” was
part of a project of differentiating “good,” universal, spiritual,
tolerant religion from bad, sectarian, material, tribal, or
nationalistic commitments.
There has been a long-standing tension in theory of religion
between those stressing religion’s elementally social or collective
character, notably in the tradition of French sociologist Emile
Durkheim or in the German critical tradition of Karl Marx, and
those stressing its grounding in the subjective experience of the
individual. Such theoretical insights took deeper root in Europe in
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries than they did in the
United States, which boasted a relative flourishing of voluntary
religion, propelled by powerful religious experience. But as
scholars in religious studies have amply shown, the shape of
American religion—and no less the definitional shape that religion
took in American courts—was also part of a process of
secularization, one which privileged the religious exercise of some,
namely Protestants, over that of others, especially
Roman Catholics.72
Although courts were not a principal arena for the
management of religious diversity in the United States until the
1940s, American religious historians observe that the discourse of
religious freedom privileging individual, private belief over
corporate practice was well honed in nineteenth century efforts to
restrict the reach of Roman Catholic institutions, especially
parochial schools.73 Ironically, the discourse of religious freedom
was that which authorized discrimination against the religious
freedom of Catholics, since the Roman Catholic Church was
deemed, despite considerable internal disagreement on the issue,

72. WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA: THE CONTENTIOUS
HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL (2004).
73. See FINBARR CURTIS, THE PRODUCTION OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2016);
TRACY FESSENDEN, CULTURE AND REDEMPTION: RELIGION, THE SECULAR, AND AMERICAN
LITERATURE (2007); DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2011); TISA
WENGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL (2017).

228

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

205

8/13/19 10:16 AM

Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right

to be monolithically against religious freedom and global in reach.
For example, in a series of deeply anti-Catholic “Blaine
Amendments” to state constitutions, governments were forbidden
from any funding of parochial schools.74
Indeed for scholars who, like Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, are
deeply informed by this scholarship, there is no lack of skepticism
that religious liberty, because of the particular instability of the
category of religion, can be a meaningful discourse for the
protection of freedoms for religious practitioners.75 Indeterminacies
aside, much of the recent scholarship at the juncture of religious
studies, culture, and law has been so focused on the power
inequities maintained by the discourse of religious freedom to have
seemingly moved well beyond religious freedom as a
viable strategy.76
But it is precisely this religious studies insight into the discourse
of religious freedom—the exclusions encoded into its presumed
universalism, and the exclusions felt sharply in Lyng, and Smith”—
that emboldens me to think about how that discourse can be trained
in new directions. For discourses don’t just function as airtight
expressions of colonizers’ wishes; they involve contradictions,
trade-offs, and in the end, consent, to continue to work. And as
discourses go, that of religious freedom will not be disappearing
anytime soon. Because it is ensconced in the first clauses of the Bill
of Rights, “religion” will long be a term of power. For the student
of religion, the category is never given, never natural; its meaning
has shifted with time, and by extension, is plastic enough to
countenance new possibilities.

74. See Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, School Choice: The
Blaine Amendments & Anti-Catholicism (June 1, 2007), http://www2.law.umaryland.edu
/marshall/usccr/documents/cr182b7620072.pdf; Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38 (1992).
75. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religion Naturalized: The New Establishment, in AFTER
PLURALISM, 94–95 (Courtney Bender & Pamela Klassen eds., 2010); see also WINNIFRED
FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2007); WINNIFRED FALLERS
SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION, (2011).
76. ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL
POLITICS OF RELIGION (2013); POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et
al. eds., 2015); ANNA SU, EXPORTING FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND AMERICAN
POWER (2016).
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E. Church Autonomy
Even beyond Native religious claims, there are moments in the
mainstream of religious freedom jurisprudence where the courts
have defined religion in ways that suggest not only the social fact
but perhaps the legal force of religion’s elementally collective
nature. Although the liberal political philosophy undergirding the
civil liberties in the Bill of Rights seems plain enough at first glance,
the dissenting traditions of the radical reformation that informed
the founders’ approach to religion were decidedly communal.
There is considerable contemporary debate among religious
freedom scholars whether the First Amendment religion clause
extends to protect the autonomy or religious freedom of churches
and religious institutions, and if so, whether those protections
pertain to the institution itself or are derivative of the rights of
individual members.77 And the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby
decision has amplified this debate in the context of RFRA.78
In the 1980s, there was a period of considerable scholarly
exchange on this question. Douglas Laycock identified a thread of
First Amendment protection for what he called “church
autonomy,” drawing on a tradition of judicial deference in church
property disputes.79 Courts came to settle those cases by generally
deferring questions of orthodoxy to the denominational juridical
structures themselves.80 In the 1980s, cases developing an
interpretation of the “ministerial exception” to anti-discrimination
77. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 99
WIS. L. REV. 99 (1989). For the problematic nature of trying to stabilize religious claims by
deference to religious institutions, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Why Distinguish Religion,
Legally Speaking?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1121 (2014).
78. See THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman et al.
eds., 2016).
79. Laycock, supra note 77; see also, Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 85–86 (1998); Frederick Schauer,
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005).
80. This same reasoning would later inform some judicial regard that what
congregations or dioceses did with their property was itself protectable religious free
exercise, and this view was codified in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, which clarified that what collective religious entities chose to do with
their worship spaces was properly to be understood as religious exercise. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A).
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statutes raised the question of where individual rights to religious
free exercise end and where the rights of religious organizations
begin. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, the Supreme Court
had upheld the First-Amendment-rights logic of religious
exemptions from the reach of anti-discrimination laws in particular
situations.81 In Amos, a custodian at a Mormon facility was
dismissed for failing to receive a “temple recommend,” a formal
church commendation of conduct, and the Court held that the
religious exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not
violate the Establishment Clause.82 In an article concerned with a
liberal secularist bias against the rights of religious groups to selfdefinition, Frederick Gedicks argued that such cases “should be
resolved by deferring to the group, even at the cost of infringing
upon important individual and government anti-discrimination
interests.”83 Gedicks’s recognition that group rights extends
beyond a social contract notion that groups’ rights are inferred from
the rights of individuals was not meant to be illiberal.
“[C]onstitutional recognition of a strong right of religious group
autonomy in making membership decisions,” he argued, “is
necessary to preserve religious pluralism and the individual
autonomy that is at the heart of liberalism.”84
The discussion of church autonomy was renewed in the wake
of Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC, a 2012 Supreme Court ruling where a
“ministerial exception” to employment provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act was found to protect a Lutheran
school from the claims of a dismissed teacher, even though the
nature of her work was not primarily religious because she was a
“called teacher,” as opposed to a “lay teacher,” and because the
church claimed they trained her as a minister and considered her
one.85 Extrapolating from what the majority opinion considered a
81. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
82. Id.
83. Gedicks, supra note 77, at 105.
84. Id. at 105–06.
85. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC (Hosanna-Tabor),
565 U.S. 171 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990).
See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013); Thomas C. Berg et al.,
Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions,
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long history of government deference going back to the Magna
Carta, the Court deferred in the case to a religious institution’s own
definitions for what constitutes a “minister” for the religious
purposes it alone defines.86
Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzmann took issue with a
developing “religious institutionalism” in First Amendment
thought. “Institutions do not, in themselves, give rise to any
distinctive set of rights, autonomy, or sovereignty,” they argued.
“[W]hat might be called institutional or church autonomy is
ultimately derived from individual rights of conscience.”87
Others welcomed Hosanna Tabor as “a clear case for the
Church.”88 For Richard Horwitz, the decision signaled an
“institutional turn” that need not rely on the unique rights of
religious institutions but nonetheless asserts that religious
institutions perform a “distinctive function.” Religious “institutions
are a constitutionally significant element of our infrastructure of
public discourse,” Horwitz writes, “not as God-given or ‘natural,’
but simply as important and well established . . . . These
institutions developed alongside, and in some cases preexisted, the
liberal state itself, and have long been coordinate parts of our
broader social structure. The state—and its limits—formed with
these institutions in mind. No mysticism is required to suggest that
this might be constitutionally relevant.”89
As will be discussed below, Hobby Lobby introduces a Supreme
Court holding that closely held private corporations have rights to
the free exercise of religion that are distinct from the individual
religious liberty rights of individual owners. But before we depart
21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 201, 206 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”:
(Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013); Paul
Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L REV. 1049 (2013); Michael W.
McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012).
86. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171, 182–83 (2012).
87. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA.
L. REV. 917, 920 (2013). For some scholars, Hosanna-Tabor produced the right result, but less
on the grounds of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment than on the Assembly and
other clauses. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the
Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73 (2014); John D. Inazu, The Four
Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787 (2014); John D. Inazu, The
Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335 (2013).
88. Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 839, 840 (2012).
89. Horwitz, supra note 85, at 1052.
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from a discussion of the question of group rights to religious
freedom under the First Amendment, we should attend to the 1972
Supreme Court decision that perhaps makes the most apt case for
a more expansive view of Native American religious freedom as a
group right.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, widely
acknowledged as the high-water mark of Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence, presented sufficient ambiguity to generate an
important exchange about whether the First Amendment protected
the rights of groups to religious liberty. The details of the case offer
some sound analogies for collective rights of Native American
religious freedom. Yoder was an Amish father who, along with two
other families, was prosecuted for refusing to enroll children in
public schools after eighth grade, per Wisconsin’s compulsory
education law.90 The families took the issue to the courts, claiming
that Wisconsin’s law violated their free exercise of religion, and
ultimately prevailed in a nearly unanimous decision. The Court
applied a Sherbert analysis, first, determining that the Old Order
Amish religion had been burdened by the generally applicable law
and, secondly, weighing whether Wisconsin had made a sufficient
showing of its “compelling government interest” in thus burdening
Yoder’s free exercise right. Most religious liberty commentators
gravitate toward the decision’s now quite remarkable
pronouncement that religious freedom might in some cases
outweigh compulsory education: “only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”91
But the extensive balancing analysis undertaken to get there is
suggestive for thinking about the group rights of Native American
religious traditions. To be sure, the Court was specifically holding
unconstitutional the criminalization of the non-complying parents
under the Wisconsin compulsory education law; it was their
individual religious exercise rights at stake. Still, the analysis
turned on the broadly communal, and broadly religious, nature of
the Amish traditional way of life and the threat that compulsory
90. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
91. Id. at 215. “We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State’s

interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or
subordination of all other interests.” Id.
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public education would have for the passing on of that Amish way
of life. Perhaps this is rooted in a sentimental regard for the
countercultural quaintness of the Amish, but, in any case, the Court
held that First Amendment protections extended to the entire
Amish way of life, having ascertained that this way of life was
“inseparable and interdependent” with Amish religion and
distinguished from merely “subjective” rejection of social values
that are merely “philosophical and personal”:
The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared
by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living. . . .
This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover, for
the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic
belief. . . . [R]eligion pervades and determines virtually their
entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet
through the strictly enforced rules of the church community.92

Ira Lupu has argued that “individuals, not institutions, are
always the ultimate source of religious conviction,” and cases such
as Yoder recognize the aggregated interests of individuals and not
the interests of the Amish in general.93 Still, the Court’s analysis
turns on interpreting the claims of the Yoder parents in terms of the
intergenerational passing on of a religious way of life going
back centuries.94
While Professor Lupu has understood that any apparent
“group” rights in Yoder were purely associational and derivative of
individual rights, Ronald Garet has interpreted Yoder in terms of its
recognition of Amish “groupness” or “communality.”95 Garet reads

92. Id. at 216.
93. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of

Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 422 (1987).
94. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the
Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious
beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that
belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish
communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the
State’s enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
95. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1001 (1983).
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Yoder together with one of the key Supreme Court cases affirming
Native American tribal sovereignty, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
to argue that Courts have and can further extend a jurisprudence
that promotes “communality” or “groupness” as among the key
social goods.96
F. Group Rights to Native American Religious Freedom
as a Hybrid Bundle of Rights
A further consideration in a discussion of group rights inspired
by Yoder is whether a consideration of Yoder, or any other Free
Exercise Clause ruling involving neutral laws of general
applicability, should matter in light of the Smith decision.97 But the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith did not overturn Yoder; it merely
distinguished the case as not controlling for Smith. 98 Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion in Smith took pains to distinguish Smith from
Yoder, since the Wisconsin compulsory education law in question
was, like the Oregon controlled substance statute, a neutral law of
general applicability.99 Scalia reasoned that in Yoder, it was not
religious freedom alone that tipped the scales, but religious
freedom claims bundled together with other rights—parental
rights in the case of Yoder—and Scalia saw no such bundle of rights
present in the Smith case.100
Alison Dussias argues that Native American religious freedom
claims, at least those by federally recognized tribes or by members
of those tribes, are indeed to be construed as hybrid matters of
bundled rights of the sort Justice Scalia speaks about in the
Smith ruling:
In the case of Indian religious practices, one can argue that other
rights, in addition to speech and association rights, are also at
stake, such as the right of tribes to have their sovereignty
respected, as well as rights flowing from the trust relationship
between tribes and the United States. . . . Because the federaltribal relationship also has a constitutional basis, tribal religious
rights claims can be understood as hybrid rights claims. Indeed,

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
Id. at 881–82.
Id.
Id.
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the Government cited its obligations pursuant to tribal rights as
secular purposes underlying management plans at Rainbow
Bridge National Monument and other public lands.
Consequently, under the Smith hybrid rights doctrine,
government actions that burden Indian religious exercise
arguably are subject to compelling interest scrutiny even postSmith, without need for consideration of RFRA, on the theory that
they burden hybrid rights.101

I underscore Carpenter’s point here. Indeed, whether or not
courts will find their way to recognizing the typically collective
nature of Native American claims to religious freedom, there ought
to be judicial recognition that even a Native American individual’s
religious freedom rights are meaningfully bundled together in the
federal government’s special nation-to-nation relationship with
recognized tribes.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION
In this Part, I turn from judicial consideration of religious
freedom law to statutory and administrative accommodations
specific to Native American cultures and religions, protections that
are specifically rooted not in the universal rights of religious
freedom—though they appeal to that logic in substantive ways
— but in the distinctive political status under federal Indian law of
Native American communities, at least those receiving federal
acknowledgement as American Indian tribes or Alaskan
Native communities.
A. Legislative Accommodations
Although Native leaders and their advocates drew on the
discourse of religion and religious freedom to gain congressional
passage in 1978 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA), the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act (NAGPRA) of 1990, and AIRFA’s Peyote Amendments of 1994,
and although courts in certain high-profile cases interpreted those
statutes as religious freedom laws, these protections decidedly
101. Allison M. Dussias, Friend, Foe, Frenemy: The United States and American Indian
Religious Freedom, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 417–18 (2012).
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relied for their logic on the distinctive political status of federally
recognized Native American tribes and their members, and thus
instances of collective rights. This stands in contrast with the view
that such laws as AIRFA are primarily clarifications of religious
freedom law, applying those protections to individuals in their
capacity as religious practitioners of Native religions.102
Even when certain courts came to interpret AIRFA or NAGPRA
more in terms of the logic of religious freedom and thus delimited
the reach of the respective statutes, the executive branch affirmed a
number of procedural protections, notably President Clinton’s
Executive Order 13007 on American Indian Sacred Sites103 and
Executive Order 13175 on Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Governments,104 and regulatory changes in 1994 to
protections under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act.105 These administrative actions may reference the importance
of protecting sacred sites, or “religion,” together with formal
reversals of former federal policy criminalizing the practice of
Native American religions, but they, too, turn on logic of the
distinctive political status of federally recognized Indian tribes,
tribal self-determination, and the government-to-government
relationship between the United States and the tribes.
B. The Federal Trust Responsibility and Cultural/Religious Rights
The American Indian Movement and an American
counterculture embracing “Indianness” did much to transform the
political climate in which Native claims could be asserted by the

102. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996; Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13. (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(3).
Congress did not define Indian Tribe in AIRFA narrowly to include only those Native
nations with formal federal recognition and specified as its consulting class “native
traditional religious leaders[,]” not the governments of recognized tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(2).
Still, the 1994 Peyote Amendments to AIRFA did, for the purposes of those specific
amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(3).
103. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 app. at 690–91 (2012).
104. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). This Executive Order
was affirmed in President Obama’s Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 2009 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 887 (Nov. 5, 2009).
105. Regulations were amended in 2004 under Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act. See 36 C.F.R. 800(c)(2)(ii) (2019).
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1970s; so too did the legal context. Under President Nixon, the
United States formally adopted a policy of Indian selfdetermination and a series of court decisions firmed up a legal basis
for that policy, elaborating on two principles, treaty and trust that
went deep into the legal past.106 The specific nation-to-nation
obligations spelled out in hundreds of different treaties, with what
the courts recognized as “domestic dependent nations,” were
interpreted to create a special federal trust responsibility with those
tribes as a guardian to a ward.107 Although it is not surprising that
such a paternalistic approach has provided a source of federal
power, including a source of power to intervene in tribal affairs to
protect the rights of individual tribal members,108 it has also served
as a source of tribal rights, especially when courts have held the
United States accountable to the “highest fiduciary standards” in
its trustee role.109
And while the federal trust responsibility applies in fairly plain
legal fashion to management of natural and economic resources, it
has also been understood to extend to cultural resources, including
languages and religions of tribes.110 Rooted in treaties, the trust
relationship also distinguishes the federal government’s
relationship with federally recognized tribes from its treatment of
other minority populations, including, vexingly, Native
communities not formally recognized by the United States.
There have been equal protection, due process, voting rights,
and other civil rights challenges to this approach to federal Indian
law and policy. In a series of cases in the 1970s, even as it was ruling
otherwise in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,111 the
Supreme Court made clear, in Morton v. Mancari (1974), that it was
the political, rather than racial, character of American Indian status
that had animated federal Indian law and justified the Bureau of
106. President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS
564 (July 8, 1970); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93–638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n (2012)).
107. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). For application to
Native religions, see United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128–29 (2002).
108. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
109. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252
(D.D.C. 1972).
110. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 176.
111. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Indian Affairs’s hiring preference for Indians.112 In a cluster of
related rulings in 1977,113 1978,114and 1979,115 the Supreme Court
suggested that laws that “might otherwise be constitutionally
offensive” might be acceptable if they are enacted pursuant to the
United States’ trust relationship.116 To underscore the non-racial
basis of its reasoning, the Court in Morton v. Mancari made explicit
that the focus on members of federally recognized tribes, rather
than on American Indians generally, suggested the political and
non-racial basis for the unique relationship.117 The approach has
broadly safeguarded other Indian laws supporting tribal selfdetermination, such as the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, which recognized the tribes as
contractors, akin to states and local governments, for federal
programs; and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, passed in the
same year as AIRFA, that privileged adoption and foster placement
of Native children within tribes.118
The context of these other legal developments in the 1970s is
crucial to understanding how AIRFA, NAGPRA, and the AIRFA
Peyote Amendments of 1994 appear not simply as conventional
112. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).

The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but,
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are
governed by the BIA in a unique fashion. . . . Here, the preference is reasonably
and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal. This is the principal
characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial
discrimination.
Id. at 554.
113. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal legislation with
respect to Indian tribes, although extending to Indians as such, is not based upon
impermissible racial classifications. Quite the contrary, classifications expressly
singling out Indian tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly provided for in
the Constitution and supported by the ensuing history of the Federal
Government’s relations with Indians.
Id. at 645.
114. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
115. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation
(Yakima Indian Nation), 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
116. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (2002) (quoting Yakima Indian
Nation, 429 U.S. at 501).
117. The Morton Court noted that because the preference applied “only to members of
‘federally recognized’ tribes,” the preference could be seen to not be directed toward a racial
group. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
118. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450
–450n. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2012).
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religious freedom protections for individuals, but as protections for
a particular species of religious exercise by tribes as collectives. In
this regard, the statutes remain wedded to the notion that Native
Americans possess a special political and legal status that
distinguishes many Native protections from the civil liberties
applying to all American citizens.
C. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978)
Amid other efforts to support tribal self-determination in
Washington, formal congressional endorsement of religious and
cultural rights was clearly not a priority for all tribal leaders,
concerned as tribal leaders were at the time with addressing abject
poverty and related social ills plaguing reservation communities.
Furthermore, the conceptualization of federal Indian law has
tended to partition off religious and cultural rights from other
aspects of tribal sovereignty. But for Suzan Harjo and others in the
coalition that worked to craft and secure passage of AIRFA,
religious and cultural freedoms were “atmospheric” of other
dimensions of tribal self-determination and sovereignty advanced
in the fields of economic development, education, and
jurisdiction.119 As Harjo put it: “This is part of the big stuff, and it’s
foundational, it’s fundamental, it’s atmospheric, it’s contextual to
everything else. If the traditional Indians stop being the traditional
people and our religions and cultures and languages cease to exist,
there are no more Native people.”120
For this reason, Native leaders sought a broad United States
declaration formally disclaiming the civilization regulations that,
for fifty years, had criminalized Indian religions under assimilation
policies, or that placed “religious infringements” “result[ing] from
the lack of knowledge or the insensitive and inflexible enforcement
of Federal policies and regulations premised on a variety of laws.”
These infringements include laws “designed for such worthwhile
purposes as conservation and preservation of natural species and
resources but were never intended to relate to Indian religious

119. Interview with Suzan Shown Harjo, Director, Morning Star Institute (Oct.
21, 2009).
120. Id.
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practices and, therefore, were passed without consideration of their
effect on traditional American Indian religions.”121 AIRFA’s formal
restatement of policy reads as follows:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the
United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and
Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship
through ceremonials and traditional rites.122

To the policy declaration was added a process for federal
agencies to “evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation
with native traditional religious leaders in order to determine
appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native
American religious cultural rights and practices,” calling for an
executive branch report to Congress after the first year.123
What is more, AIRFA’s congressional findings specify some of
the distinctive contours of Native religions that have been denied
by U.S policies: “access to sacred sites required in their religions,
including cemeteries” and “use and possession of sacred objects
necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies.”124 For
these reasons, not to mention the plain language of the policy
directive, AIRFA could be read as a statutory clarification that the
First Amendment, if it were to effectively protect traditional Native
religions, would fully protect “access to [sacred] sites, use and
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites.”125 And, to be sure lawyers
representing claimants in its first ten years advanced such a
reading, AIRFA grafted a variety of Native claims to free exercise
jurisprudence and secured for their clients clear First Amendment

121. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012)).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012).
123. Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 2, 92 Stat. at 470. Significantly, the consulting class of AIRFA
are “native traditional religious leaders” and not tribal governments.
124. Id. at 469. Later, by way of the 1994 amendment, Congress added a clause
protecting peyote use specifically. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2012).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
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free exercise rights to sacred lands or to sacred practices.126
Although there were some hopeful signs elsewhere in the lower
courts, most of these cases claiming that AIRFA clarified First
Amendment
rights
wound
up
failing
in
various
127
appellate courts.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Lyng put the final nail in the
coffin to the fuller reading of AIRFA as a clarification of how the
First Amendment should be applied to Native American claims.
The Lyng Court found, “[n]owhere in the law is there so much as a
hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any judicially
enforceable individual rights,” and found in AIRFA’s legislative
history a statement by its sponsor, Representative Udall, that “the
bill would not ‘confer special religious rights on Indians,’ would
‘not change any existing State or Federal law,’ and in fact ‘has no
teeth in it.’”128
D. A Finer-Grained Reading of AIRFA
That courts found AIRFA could not hold water as a statutory
enactment of First Amendment religious freedom protections for
Native people led many to conclude AIRFA was a legislative
failure, another empty promise to Native people, who were again
tragically undermined. Consider, for example, Andrew Gulliford’s
discussion of the “Failure of the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act” in an otherwise nuanced treatment of sacred site

126. E.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856
(8th Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d
1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
127. For a fuller list of litigation on the basis of AIRFA in its first decade, see Sharon
O’Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 27 (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991).
128. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (quoting
124 CONG. REC. 21,444–45 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall)). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
agreed AIRFA “does not create any judicially enforceable rights” but added:
[T]he absence of any private right of action in no way undermines the statute’s
significance as an express congressional determination that federal land
management decisions are not ‘internal’ Government ‘procedures,’ but are instead
governmental actions that can and indeed are likely to burden Native American
religious practices. That such decisions should be subject to constitutional
challenge, and potential constitutional limitations, should hardly come as
a surprise.
Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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management: “With the vote on AIRFA, Congress recognized
Indian religious beliefs but made no real effort to protect those
beliefs and practices. Legislators passed a useless law.”129
This view is apt in part. Even as the advisory, procedural
resolution of Congress that the Lyng Court said it was, AIRFA was
not taken very seriously by the two Reagan administrations and,
arguably, others, thereafter. But AIRFA has hardly been the failure
that this common reading of it suggests. In at least four respects,
AIRFA proved to be a remarkable legislative accomplishment, and
one that helps understand how Native religious rights can be
construed as collective rights.
First, AIRFA grafted into the federal trust responsibility a
specific concern for the religious and cultural rights of the tribes.
This was explicit in AIRFA’s wording: U.S. policy would “protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right[s].”130
Especially given its acknowledgement that the United States had
formerly pursued policies expressly designed to undermine Native
religions, AIRFA’s policy redirection was no small matter. But
AIRFA’s preamble also took pains to suggest there were a host of
inadvertent ways that federal policies had the effect of
undermining Native religions. Importantly, Congress did not
define Indian tribe in AIRFA narrowly to include only those Native
nations with formal federal recognition, and specified as its
consulting class “native traditional religious leaders,” not the
governments of recognized tribes.131
Second, AIRFA mandated the thorough policy review of the
various federal agencies and report to Congress, helping set the
agenda for accommodations and actions that would extend its
protections. As President Carter’s liaison with the tribes, Suzan
Shown Harjo was tapped to guide this process, and engaged a

129. ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL
TRADITIONS 101–02 (2000). A better reading of AIRFA on this score is found in BURTON, supra
note 39.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1996. As I discuss below, AIRFA’s extension of the federal trust
responsibility to protect and preserve Native American religions would become even clearer
when AIRFA was amended in 1994.
131. Id. The 1994 Peyote Amendments to AIRFA did define “Indian tribe,” for the
purposes of those specific amendments, in such a way that tied the peyote provisions to
members of federally recognized tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(2) (2012).
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parallel study and implementation project by the Native American
Rights Fund and the American Indian Law Center which was able
to more thoroughly survey and consult in the field with the
religious leaders.132 From its consultation, the study identified the
following key issues where federal policies infringed on Native
religions: (1) “preservation of and access to sacred” sites, (2) “the
right to religious use of peyote,” (3) “the right to recover religious
objects,” (4) “the right to cross borders freely for religious
purposes,” (5) “the rights of incarcerated Indians,” (6) the “right to
religious privacy,” (7) “the rights of Indian students,” and (8) “the
right to traditional hair styles” in schools, prisons, reformatories,
and military service.133 Within several years of AIRFA’s passage,
the public record included formal recognition of the range of
religious infringements that government actions directly or
indirectly placed on Native communities, laying the groundwork
for the subsequent legislative and administrative accommodations
on sacred sites, ceremonial peyote use, repatriation of human
remains from museums and scientific collections, and return of
ceremonial items and objects of cultural patrimony.134
Third, AIRFA created language for subsequent administrations
to breathe meaningful life into its provisions and to relate it to other
review and consultation processes, such as those under
environmental and historic preservation laws, toward more
integrated and serious federal consideration of tribal claims. In
1996, in the spirit of AIRFA and out of a concern to expand minimal
readings of its provisions as they were intended to apply to federal
agencies, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13007.135 The
Executive Order mandated that agencies managing federal lands
would: “(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian
sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid
adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites.

132. See “We Also Have a Religion”: The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the
Religious Freedom Project of the Native American Rights Fund, ANNOUNCEMENTS (Native Am.
Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Winter 1979.
133. Id. at 8–9.
134. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE: AMERICAN INDIAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT (1979).
135. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 app. at 690–91 (2012).
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Where appropriate, agencies shall maintain the confidentiality of
sacred sites.”136
Fourth, the language of Executive Order 13007 further
elaborated the consultation logic of AIRFA to “ensure reasonable
notice” of “proposed actions or land management policies that may
restrict future access to or ceremonial use of, or adversely affect the
physical integrity of, sacred sites,” and aligned such consultation
with a 1994 Executive memorandum, “Government-toGovernment
Relations
with
Native
American
Tribal
Governments.”137 This was not just a culture of consultation; the
momentum gained through AIRFA’s passage carried into a
government-wide statutory, not just regulatory, tribal consultation
provision in the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979138
and in an amendment to the Section 106 Review process of the
National Historic Preservation Act (1966) providing that federal
agencies consult with tribes where they make a religious or cultural
claim to a significant place.139 President Clinton’s Executive Order
on “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments” extends and clarifies what proper consultation with
tribal sovereigns should look like, as a matter of policy.140
In sum, while a plain reading of AIRFA, or one shaped by the
courts’ interpretation, finds it lacking legal teeth for the full-fledged
protections that religious freedom suggests in constitutional law,
AIRFA set in motion a procedural mechanism for federal
accommodations of religious and cultural concerns of sovereign
tribes as collectivities. To be sure, in the absence of specific legal
causes of action, and thus judicial review, beyond those under the
Administrative Procedure Act, such procedural mechanisms rely
for their effect more on the diligence of the federal agency involved,
and under various administrations that may or may not consider
Native rights a priority among competing goods.
136. Id. § 1(a).
137. Id. § 2(a) (citing Presidential Memorandum on Government-to-Government

Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994),
reprinted in 25 U.S.C. § 5301 app. at 488 (2012)).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (2012).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2012) (“In carrying out its responsibilities under section
470f of this title, a Federal agency shall consult with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization that attaches religious and cultural significance to properties described in
subparagraph (A).”).
140. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
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Still, they place considerations of Native religious and cultural
rights on a footing quite other than that of the individual civil
liberty basis on which religious freedom has generally been seen to
rest. AIRFA directs the United States to consult (and ultimately to
make agreements) with tribal governments to accommodate what
practices, places, objects, and beliefs those nations indicate are
urgent to them without necessarily having to make a showing that
they are protectable facets of “religious” exercise under religious
freedom jurisprudence. Such an approach can honor the porous
boundaries between tribal religions and tribal cultures, economies,
polities, land-bases, or identities. And as suggested by the
confidentiality that characterizes those consultation processes
—one of the issue areas of friction identified through the AIRFA
review process between Native religions and federal agency
policies—the tribes can relate matters to them and seek
accommodations without violating the secrecy that often
accompanies tribal religious beliefs, practices, and institutions or
without exposing sacred places, practices, beliefs, or objects to
unwelcome voyeurism on the public record.141
E. AIRFA’s 1994 Peyote Amendment
Importantly, if AIRFA was not to be a binding clarification that
the First Amendment would apply to the distinctive contours of
Native religions, the distinctive contours of AIRFA as a policy
statement of the federal trust responsibility to the tribes proved that
it was friendlier terrain for distinctly Native religious concerns than
the broader religious freedom protections of RFRA. Recall that it
was shared outrage at the Supreme Court’s stripping of the First
Amendment’s free exercise protection in Employment Division v.
Smith that unified a coalition of religious groups across the culturewars spectrum and secured near-unanimous support for RFRA.142
But for all its references to Smith, RFRA did not expressly reinstate
the broad rights to ceremonial peyote use won so ably by
practitioners of the Native American Church in dozens of state
statutes and through a broad range of court-backed protections of

141. See Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See supra Section I.A.

246

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

205

8/13/19 10:16 AM

Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right

Peyotism.143 In the words of James Botsford, a Wisconsin attorney
representing members of the Native American Church at the time,
“[w]e took the hit and were not in the huddle.”144
Having already begun specifically to consult with leaders of the
Native American Church as part of the policy review mandated by
AIRFA, and desiring to make any peyote protection “Scalia-proof,”
as James Botsford put it, the strategy was to “make it an Indian
right, rooted in the trust relationship” and resting on the distinctive
legal and political status of the tribes and their members, which
would also immunize it from equal protection challenges under
civil rights law.145 The 1994 Amendment to AIRFA, as Congress
passed it, provided that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession,
or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited
by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or
discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise
applicable benefits under public assistance programs.146

And its definitions section made clear that “Indians” referred to
members of federally recognized tribes and that “Indian religion”
meant “any religion . . . which is practiced by Indians, and . . . the
origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional
Indian culture or community.”147
143. See People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
144. James Botsford and Walter Echo-Hawk, Remarks at “Roundtable on Native

American Religious Freedom,” (May 2009). For an account of the effort, see James Botsford
and Walter Echo Hawk, The Legal Tango: The Native American Church v. the United States of
America, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 123
–55 (Huston Smith & Reuben Snake eds., 1996).
145. James Botsford and Walter Echo-Hawk, supra note 144.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012).
147. Id. § 1996a(c). The statute’s definitions section reads in part:
(1) the term “Indian” means a member of an Indian tribe; (2) the term “Indian
tribe” means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group or
community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or
established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, (43 U.S.C. 1601
et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians; (3) the
term “Indian religion” means any religion— (A) which is practiced by Indians,
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Such definitional language was not only crafted to persuade
Congress that there would be no slippery slope to gratuitous or
untoward peyote use. It was expressly keyed to the logic of federal
Indian law’s recognition of the special political and legal status of
members of tribes with rights based on the treaty and trust
relationship. This logic could be undone, the coalition feared, by
opening the door to those claiming only religious freedom rights to
peyote use. And to be sure, there are any number of others claiming
religious freedom exemptions to controlled substance laws that
have looked to AIRFA’s “Peyote Amendment” for similar equal
protection sustenance of their claims.148 In one such case, the
Supreme Court agreed with the RFRA claim by members of a
religious community of South American origin to ceremonial
ingestion of hoasca, which like peyote was regulated under federal
controlled substance laws.149 Lawyers from the coalition
representing the Native American Church agreed not to interfere
with the RFRA claim, but took pains to work against any equal
protection claim made by O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do
Vegetal with respect to the AIRFA peyote exemption.150
F. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990)
The coalition that convinced Congress to recognize religious
freedom effectively as a facet of Indian law for Peyotist tribal
members was successful in part because it was largely the same
circle of advocates, lawyers, tribal spiritual and political leaders,
and allies who had recently won congressional passage of two
repatriation statutes: the National Museum of the American Indian
Act (1989) (NMAI Act)151 and the better known Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).152

and (B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian
culture or community.
Id.
148. See, e.g., Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th
Cir. 2016).
149. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
150. James Botsford & Walter Echo-Hawk, Remarks at “Roundtable on Native
American Religious Freedom,” Vermillion, S.D. (May 2009).
151. National Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q–15 (2012).
152. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
13 (2012).
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Basically, the NMAI Act legislatively made provisions for the
repatriation of human remains and other items as part of the storied
transfer of more than 800,000 objects in the Heye Collection from
New York City’s then-decrepit Museum of the American Indian to
the Smithsonian Institution, a transfer that occasioned the creation
of the Washington Mall’s magnificent National Museum of the
American Indian. Under the NMAI Act, the flagship national
museums of the Smithsonian were to inventory, identify, and
consider for return to tribes or lineal Indian descendants the tens of
thousands of Native American human remains, and a variety of
objects, in their collections.153 But perhaps the bigger story is what
NMAI Act negotiations with the Smithsonian enabled: swift
passage the following year of a remarkable NAGPRA statute
requiring that the repatriation process extend to all federally
funded museums and government agencies, extending the items to
be inventoried, identified, and considered for return beyond
human remains and burial objects to several other categories of
“cultural items.”154 These categories, later added by amendment to
the NMAI act, most notably include “sacred objects,” defined as
those “needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for
the practice of traditional Native American religions by their
present day adherents,” and “cultural patrimony,” defined as “an
object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance
central to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than
property owned by an individual Native American, and which,
therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any
individual.”155 NAGPRA required, under penalty, “expeditious
return” of “culturally identified” human remains and specified
cultural items from the collections of museums and agencies to
lineal descendants, in those cases where a clear line of descent could
be drawn to human remains, or to tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations who could show “cultural affiliation by a
preponderance of the evidence,” which statutorily was not limited
to scientific evidence, but could include “oral traditional”

153. 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-15.
154. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13.
155. Id. § 3001.
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information or expert opinion.156 To these provisions was added the
criminalization of trafficking in the protected items and tribal
control of any human remains and cultural items subsequently
excavated on tribal lands or federal lands in aboriginal tribal
territories.157 Finally, NAGPRA created a Review Committee,
including appointees from both tribal and scientific communities,
to resolve the many contested or competing claims sure to result.158
I cannot here undertake the fuller treatment warranted by the
NMAI Act and NAGPRA, and particularly the lengthy subsequent
struggles over their regulations. I could in any case add little to two
very fine book length treatments that treat NAGPRA not merely as
a “legal event,” in the words of Kathleen Fine-Dare, but as a
“cultural and political process . . . one that will be shaped for long
years to come.”159 Greg Johnson brings theoretically-informed
religious studies attentiveness to the making of religion in that legal
process, though importantly he distinguishes his line of analysis
from the presumptions of suggesting that there is in the doing a
mere “invention of tradition.”160 With a careful review of
NAGPRA’s legislative history, the complex claims of different
Native Hawaiian organizations, and, in subsequent work, the
ongoing deliberations of the NAGPRA Review Committee,
Johnson shows how the NAGPRA process has generated a large
body of strategically-positioned religious speech, whereby Native
practitioners lay claim, on the one hand, to the specific obligations,
practices, and beliefs unique to their respective collective traditions,
and to the universally applicable human rights discourse of religion
on the other.161 In this process, Congress and administrative bodies
remarkably find themselves debating definitions of religiously
charged categories like “sacred object,” “cultural patrimony,” and
the evidentiary weight of divinatory and oral traditions. Following

156.
157.
158.
159.

43 C.F.R. 10.2 (e) (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (a)(4)).
25 U.S.C. § 3002 (c).
Id. § 3006.
KATHLEEN S. FINE-DARE, GRAVE INJUSTICE: THE AMERICAN INDIAN REPATRIATION
MOVEMENT AND NAGPRA 7 (2002).
160. GREG JOHNSON, SACRED CLAIMS: REPATRIATION AND LIVING TRADITION (2007).
161. Id.; see also Greg Johnson, Apache Revelation: Making Indigenous Religion in the Legal
Sphere, in SECULARISM AND RELIGION MAKING 170, 170–86 (Markus Dressler & Arvind-Pal S.
Mandair eds., 2011).

250

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

205

8/13/19 10:16 AM

Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right

the lines of Johnson’s analysis, I would emphasize the manner with
which the “religious freedom” protections of NAGPRA are
strategically conformed to the structure of a collective right.
G. NAGPRA in the Courts: “Religion” v. “Science”
With its considerable reach, NAGPRA has produced no small
amount of litigation, and court interpretations have both
strengthened and weakened its various provisions.162 In perhaps
the highest profile challenge to the protections of NAGPRA,
Bonnichsen v. United States, a physical anthropologist claimed that a
federal decision to repatriate the 9,300-year-old remains of so-called
“Kennewick Man,” found in 1996 on federal land along the
Columbia River, to a group of area tribes that considered him an
ancestor according to customary determinations of kinship and
lineage, violated the statute itself.163 In its ruling in favor of the
scientist, the Ninth Circuit not only recognized his standing to sue
under NAGPRA, which the U.S. had argued was only authorized
for tribal claimants, but agreed that the oral traditional evidence
presented by the tribes could not have been found reasonably to
outweigh the genetic and archeological scientific evidence placing
the remains several thousand years before the tribes in question
had arrived in the region. Specifically, the court held that for the
purposes of NAGPRA and by using the statute’s own definitions,
the remains are not “Native American.”164 Still, the Bonnichsen
decision took pains to show how the federal decision to repatriate
the remains to the tribes had gone too far in valorizing the
evidentiary weight of oral tradition, particularly as “the record as a
whole does not show where historical fact ends and mythic tale
begins,” over scientific evidence suggesting no “group identity”
between the remains and the tribes in question.165 So if there are
elements of the NAGPRA process, such as definitional discussions
of what counts as a “sacred object” or appeals to visionary
162. See United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999); Pueblo of San Ildefonso
v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553
(D.N.M. 1996).
163. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 367 F.3d 864
(9th Cir. 2004).
164. Id. at 972.
165. Id. at 979; see also Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1143–44
(D. Or. 2002) (District Court holding).
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experience as evidence of affiliation in repatriation proceedings,
which suggest its texture as a religious freedom statute, judicial
interpretations, too, have stressed NAGPRA’s religious leanings.
H. NAGPRA: A Finer-Grained Reading
But as with AIRFA, a closer reading of NAGPRA requires us
not only to distinguish, as Greg Johnson has, between “strategic”
appeals to the universality of religious freedom, and also to the
culture-specific funerary and ceremonial traditions of burial, but
also to see how the combination of those two religious discourses
have been grafted legally onto the discourse of collective tribal
rights under federal Indian law. Just as AIRFA’s Peyote
Amendment was, after the wizening process of AIRFA’s narrow
reading by the courts and the RFRA coalition’s exclusion,
strategically positioned not as an amendment to RFRA, where the
logic of religious freedom would place it, but as an amendment to
AIRFA, where the logic of federal Indian law would keep it
immune from the condemning logic of the Smith decision,166
NAGPRA took its place as a cultural/religious facet of a broader
agenda promoting tribal sovereignty.
First, NAGPRA on its face is hard to view primarily as a
religious freedom statute. Native proponents have regarded it as a
basic human rights law for its fundamental acknowledgement of
the humanity of deceased Native American persons, regarded
hitherto as archeological resources in the Antiquities Act of 1906167
and even the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.168
Second, in the typical taxonomy of legal studies, NAGPRA is
regarded as a cultural property law, not a religious freedom law,
one which ultimately rests on the questionability of title that
federally funded museums or agencies could ever have, under
common law, to human remains, or under the terms of contract and
property law, to items of cultural patrimony. Indeed, the ability to
go to courts on the basis of these property claims, even without the
repatriation statutes, arguably brought the parties to the table to
shape the legislation in the first place.

166. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–90 (1990).
167. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 (1906).
168. Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–mm.
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Third, the procedural approach to federally recognized Indian
tribes and Hawaiian organizations aligns NAGPRA and NMAI
with the federal trust responsibility to preserve and protect the
cultures, religions, and traditions of tribes, and with the
consultative framework becoming a government-to-government
relationship. Thus, grounded in this trust responsibility, the
statute’s privileging of arguably “religious” tribal claims and the
regulatory apparatus’s determinations about “sacred objects” and
their disposition, can proceed without plainly violating the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause. This logic and the case law
that develops it will be the subject of Part III.
Through AIRFA, NAGPRA, and other measures considered in
this Part, Congress and federal agencies have meaningfully
extended the trust responsibility beyond the merely economic and
natural resources of the tribes to the realm of cultural resources.
These cultural resources include the traditional religions of Native
communities with whom the U.S. acknowledges a nation-to-nation
relationship. Clearly there are problematic elements of this
structure, notably the controversial process for federal
acknowledgement and the often ambiguous legal status of
federally non-recognized tribes, a group that includes tribes like
those treaty signatories recognized by the Commonwealth of
Virginia and enjoying some measure of distinctive political status
as a result, but which remain unacknowledged by the U.S., and thus
outside the ambit of the protections discussed in this Part. But a
closer look at these statutes shows how the legislative and executive
branches have articulated a logic for recognizing Native cultural
and religious rights that is collective in nature: religious in texture,
but the legal shape of which conforms to the special political status
of the group. In the next Part, I turn to judicial affirmation of this
logic and this structure in case law.
III. JUDICIAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL
NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
In this Part, I turn from legislative and administrative
accommodations of Native religious practices and beliefs that draw
upon the discourse of religious freedom but that structurally tie
those accommodations to the collective rights of Native nations and
their members, to judicial recognition of this structure of Native
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religious rights as collective, not merely individual, matters.
Courts have articulated this distinction with some consistency as
they have rejected a wide range of challenges, including
religious freedom challenges, to legislative and administrative
religious accommodations within eagle protection. This Part will
consider those in depth, along with several other notable cases
where courts have found their way to identifying the distinctly
collective shape of certain Native American religious claims.
A. Eagle Act Accommodations
Although eagles have been protected under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act, Congress in 1940
expressly passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act to criminalize the
hunting, trafficking, bartering, and possession of eagle parts, even
a single feather, making it punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 and
up to one year in prison.169 The act was amended in 1962 to the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Act) to include golden
eagles because the two species are largely indistinguishable when
immature.170 More importantly, the amended act enabled the
Secretary of the Interior to establish regulations for exceptions “for
the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”171 Subsequently, the
National Eagle Repository was established as a catchment and
distributor for found eagle carcasses together with a permit
application process in which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, on
a first-come, first-served basis, scrutinizes whether the applicant is
an Indian who is authorized to participate in “bona fide tribal
religious ceremonies.”172 According to the regulations, permitted

169. Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (current version at 16 U.S.C.
§ 668 (2012)); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012); Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012).
170. Protection of Bald and Golden Eagles Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668(d) (2012) amended
by Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1346.
171. Id. § 668(a).
172. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2017). In weighing permit applications, the government
considers “(1) The direct or indirect effect which issuing such permit would be likely to have
upon the wild populations of bald or golden eagles; and (2) Whether the applicant is an
Indian who is authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies.” Id. The
process limits one pending application per applicant at one time and requires the following
information on the application form:

254

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

205

8/13/19 10:16 AM

Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right

eagle parts are not transferable except as those “from generation to
generation or from one Indian to another in accordance with tribal
or religious customs[.]”173 Wait times and restrictions have caused
significant problems for applicants who may wait from six to nine
months for loose feathers and two to four years for
eagle carcasses.174
Not surprisingly, because eagle feathers, claws, wings, and
other parts are of clear ritual and religious significance to so many
Native religious traditions, the permit process to operationalize this
accommodation has brought numerous legal challenges.175 Some
have argued that the permit process violated their treaty rights.176
Others have challenged various aspects of the permitting process
as a violation of their religious freedom under the First Amendment
or RFRA.177 For the purposes of this Article, I focus on cases where
(1) Species and number of eagles or feathers proposed to be taken, or acquired by
gift or inheritance.
(2) State and local area where the taking is proposed to be done, or from whom
acquired.
(3) Name of tribe with which applicant is associated.
(4) Name of tribal religious ceremony(ies) for which required.
(5) You must attach a certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is federally
recognized under the Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994 . . . .
Id.
173. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(b)(1) (2017).
174. Exceptions to the first-come, first-served basis are made where death ceremonies

or other emergencies are claimed by applicants. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116,
1123 n.12 (10th Cir. 2002).
175. See, e.g., Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally
Protected Wildlife, NAT. RESOURCES J. 709 (1990); Michael Davidson, United States v. Friday and
the Future of Native American Religious Challenges to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 86
DENV. U.L. REV. 1133 (2009); Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts:
Environmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
771 (1995). Fewer studies have paid attention to the concerns of this section. See Carpenter,
supra note 26; Matthew Perkins, The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act: Could Application of the Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs? 30 ENVTL. L.
701 (2000). For an excellent article see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free
Exercise of Religion, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 53 (2013).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F.
Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986); United States v. Thirty Eight (38) Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts,
649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nev. 1986).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
repository timetable causes eagle carcasses to become religiously impure); United States v.
Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing whether the permit system’s procedural
awkwardness violated religious freedom); United States v. Gonzalez, 957 F. Supp. 1225
(D.N.M. 1997) (discussing whether permit application requirement to disclose proposed
ceremonial use violates religious secrecy).
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a variety of religious freedom challenges under RFRA have been
asserted by practitioners of Native American religions who, by
virtue of their identity, are excluded from the accommodation
regime, which is restricted to members of federally recognized
tribes. In these cases, a range of circuit courts can be said to have,
after scrupulous consideration of competing religious clams,
consistently acknowledged the collective nature of the Native
American religious rights accommodated under the Eagle Act. The
question of religion in these cases becomes a question not of the
sincerity or particularities of the religious practice or whether or not
the religious exercise is burdened, but a question of balancing the
state’s compelling interest in the Eagle Act’s religious
accommodation, to safeguard the collective religious rights of
federally recognized tribes and their members under the federal
trust responsibility, with the asserted rights to individual religious
exercise advanced by litigants, including Native American
religious practitioners.
Courts in these cases have agreed that the United States actually
has two compelling interests in play, and a charge to strike an
optimal equipoise between those potentially competing interests.
The first, obviously, is protecting wild populations of eagles. This
was confirmed to remain a compelling interest even given the
return of bald eagle populations since passage of the Act. As one
court put it, “the bald eagle would remain our national symbol
whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles.”178 The second is
the government’s compelling interest of “preserving Native
American culture and religion,” which courts have said springs
from established federal Indian law’s two streams of treaty and
trust: the specific nation-to-nation obligations, spelled out in over
370 different treaties, to quasi sovereign, domestic, dependent
nations, on the one hand, and a federal trust relationship with those
tribes, on the other, as a guardian to a ward.179
Challenges have included those of Native claimants who were
not enrolled members of recognized tribes and thus ineligible for
the accommodation. In Gibson v. Babbitt, a Florida District Court
178. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128.
179. Id. at 1128–29. The Hardman court cites Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957

F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) and Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th
Cir. 1991).
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judge reluctantly rejected the claim to eagle feathers by Harvey
“Fire Bird” Gibson, a decorated veteran and sincere native religious
practitioner who was a lineal descendant of Native people removed
in the Trail of Tears, but who was not a member of a federally
recognized Indian Tribe.180 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
concluding that the permit restriction to members of recognized
tribes was the least restrictive means to furthering the
government’s compelling interest: “by providing bald and golden
eagle parts to federally recognized Indian tribes, the United
States . . . is fulfilling a pre-existing treaty obligation to
the tribes.”181
Three years later, in U.S. v. Antoine, the Ninth Circuit followed
the same line of reasoning in rejecting a religious freedom challenge
to the Eagle Act brought by a member of a Canadian First Nation,
even though his tribe enjoyed specific treaty rights straddling the
border between the United States and Canada.182 Leonard Antoine
served a two-year prison sentence for bringing eagle feathers
without a permit into the United States for a potlatch ceremony.183
A member of the Cowichan Band of Salish in Canada, Antoine was
ineligible for a permit as he was not a member of an Indian tribe
recognized by the United States.184 The Ninth Circuit concluded
Antoine “was excluded, not because of his faith, but because he was
not a member of a recognized Indian tribe.”185
While noting the paternalism implied in this approach, we
should observe how the Antoine court recognized a federal trust
obligation to preserve and protect the religions and cultures of
federally recognized tribes that is compelling enough to justify a
burden on the practice of those same religions when such claims
are made by individuals whose practice is not conjoined
structurally by their membership in a recognized tribe.
The exclusions based on enrollment and federal recognition
ought appropriately to trouble those concerned with the religious
freedom of all Native American tribes, not just the five hundred
180. Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
181. Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Gibson, 72 F. Supp. 2d

at 1360).
182.
183.
184.
185.

United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 919–20.
Id.
Id. at 924; see also United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 522 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2008).

257

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/13/19 10:16 AM

2019

some who have formal legal stature as “federally recognized
tribes.” Still, I want to call attention to the way the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits legally distinguish between the religious freedom claims of
individuals, keyed to universal discourses on religious beliefs and
rights of private conscience, and those asserted by association with
the distinctive political status of federally recognized tribes and the
cultural and religious heritage that are woven into peoplehood.
If courts have emphasized the political, rather than racial,
identity of those Native people eligible for Eagle Act exemptions,
they have also distinguished the political from the religious aspects
of that identity, as elaborated in the Maine case cited in Antoine.186
In Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Erwin Rupert, a
white pastor of an “all race” church that follows Native American
religious customs, asserted that he had organized a religious
community fashioned as the “Tribe of the Pahana,” a loose
reference to a Hopi prophecy.187 When a permit application citing
his tribal identity as Pahana was turned down, Rupert challenged
the Eagle Act as a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause, citing an unconstitutional “denominational preference” for
some Native American religious groups against his own.188 The
First Circuit affirmed the District Court for Maine in holding
against Rupert,189 drawing distinctions that have informed courts’
reluctance to grant Establishment Clause challenges to the
statutory religious exemption won by tribes in 1994 for peyote use
and for federal accommodations to Native communities in the
management of sacred places on public lands.190
What about the many sincere non-Native practitioners whose
practice of Native religions is in demonstrable relationship to
recognized tribal communities, or who marry tribal members and
raise children in the traditions of those Native communities? In a
186.
187.
188.
189.

Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992).
Id. at 33.
Id.
The First Circuit cited Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) and United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), to suggest that the “rational basis” or “rational relationship”
was sufficient to tie the government’s treatment of “Native Americans differently from
others in a manner that arguably creates a religious classification” to its compelling interest
in “protecting a dwindling and precious eagle population and protecting Native American
religion and culture. Rupert, 957 F.2d at 35.
190. Id. at 32.
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cluster of cases centered on Hardman and Wilgus that took nine
decisions and thirteen years to wend their way through courts, the
Tenth Circuit showed its uneasiness with the quick work the other
three circuits had made of such religious freedom claims in favor of
established federal Indian law.191 If the Tenth Circuit ultimately
came along with them in its fifth and final 2011 decision in Wilgus,
it wrestled more directly with the question of supporting the
collective tribal rights to religious traditions at the expense of
individual rights:
This case requires us to navigate the treacherous terrain at the
intersection of the federal government’s obligations, on the one
hand, to refrain from imposing burdens on the individual’s
practice of religion, and, on the other, to protect key aspects of our
natural heritage and preserve the culture of Native
American tribes.192

B. United States v. Hardman and United States v. Wilgus
A network that went up and down courts in the Tenth Circuit
illustrates well the complexity of weighing accommodations meant
to protect tribal collective religions with the individual rights to
practitioners of Native religion. Beginning in the late 1990s, the
Tenth Circuit heard three different cases on appeal from district
courts in Utah and New Mexico, and in three-judge-panel decisions
affirmed the conviction of two and threw out the conviction of the
third. In each case the question of religious freedom claims became
a question of identity and of the consequent justifiability of a
permitting process that privileged members of federally recognized
Indian tribes above other sincere practitioners of Native
American religions.
Raymond Hardman was non-Native, though his ex-wife and
two children were enrolled members in a Washington tribe, and he
lived on a Utah reservation.193 In 1993, after he had brought his
children’s maternal grandfather to Arizona for ceremonial burial,
he was given eagle feathers to hang in the truck for cleansing
191. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman,
297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).
192. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1277.
193. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1118–19.
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purposes. Upon return to Utah, Hardman approached the
Wildlife Division for a permit, but was told he would not qualify
and was found by a magistrate judge to be in violation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, a decision that was affirmed by a
federal district court.194
Like Hardman, Samuel Ray Wilgus was not of Native descent.
Raised a Baptist, he became in the 1980s a practitioner of Native
religions and received religious instruction from Southern Paiute
tribal members who were leaders in the Native American
Church.195 In 1998, Wilgus was arrested for possessing 141 eagle
feathers, several of which had been given him to mark his religious
progress in the Native American Church. Wilgus challenged his
conviction as a violation of his religious freedom.
A third litigant, Jose Luis Saenz, a lineal descendant of the
Chiricahua Apache, was not an enrolled member of any recognized
tribe. Historically, many Chiricahua were absorbed into other
Apache communities, but the community itself has not been
formally recognized as a tribe.196 In 1996, law officials searching his
home on another matter seized ceremonial items that included
eagle feathers for which he did not have a permit. Although the
criminal charges against him were dropped, he petitioned for the
return of the confiscated feathers, which was the issue in the case.197
The District Court for New Mexico ordered the return of the
feathers based on its interpretation of the religious exception for
Indian tribes under the Eagle Act. The United States appealed,
saying the court had not deferred to the executive branch’s
narrower interpretation of the Eagle Act as applying to members of
federally recognized tribes. A three-judge panel in 2001 agreed
with the District Court, affirming Saenz’s right, under RFRA, to the
returned feathers.198

194. Id.; United States v. Hardman, No. 99-CR-166-B (D. Utah 1999); Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12. Although he brought a RFRA defense in the appeal of the
magistrate’s decision to the district court, his subsequent appeal turned on discriminatory
enforcement under the equal protection clause and on the First Amendment Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses.
195. United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Utah 2009).
196. Hardman, 297 F. 3d at 1119–20.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1118–20.
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The Tenth Circuit decided to vacate its 2001 panel rulings in
each case for a rehearing en banc. In 2002, it released a decision
that affirmed Saenz’s RFRA right to the returned feathers. In the
cases of Hardman and Wilgus, the Tenth Circuit agreed the U.S.
had compelling interests of protecting eagles and of “preserving
Native American culture and religion in-and-of-themselves and
in fulfilling trust obligations to Native Americans,”199 but
concluded the government had insufficiently demonstrated that
the permitting process was the least restrictive means to
advance those compelling interests, leaving “far too many
questions unanswered.”200
Specifically the court found only “speculative” the
government’s claim that opening up eligibility to all “sincere
practitioners of Native American faiths that hold eagle feathers
sacred,” regardless of their racial identity or political status, would
“result in an increased wait substantial enough to endanger Native
American cultures” requiring factual knowledge about the
numbers of people involved, and the effect of the resurgence of
eagles on the supply for the repository system.201
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit also volunteered a potential
rethinking of Native American religions as religions. It pondered
the possibility that extending the eagle permit process to any
sincere practitioner of a Native American religion, whatever race or
political status, might allow “a wider variety of people to
participate in Native American religion,” and “foster Native
American culture and religion by exposing it to a wider array of
persons.”202 It thus remanded the combined Hardman and Wilgus
cases back to district court to gather more facts in pursuit of settling
these questions.203
A concurring opinion expressed concern that the district court
would be misled in its inquiry on remand. Judges Murphy and
Briscoe found unclear the “contours of the government’s
compelling interest in protecting Native American culture,”204

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1138 n.3 (Murphy & Briscoe, JJ., concurring)
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taking issue with the trajectory suggested by the court’s suggestion
that Native American religions would be protected and
strengthened by opening their practice up to any and all:
The majority intimates that the interest can be limited to the
maintenance of the viability of Native American cultural practices
as a historical legacy within the contours of our modern
culture. . . . Under this view, the government’s interest in
protecting Native American culture would be furthered to the
exact same extent if the available supply of eagle parts were
distributed equally to all adherents of relevant Native American
religions, without regard to whether the adherents were, in fact,
Native Americans.205

The concurring judges saw the contours of the government’s
interest “a little differently: guaranteeing members of sovereign
and semi-autonomous Indian nations the ability to carry on their
traditional way of life” and clarified the government’s task on
remand to garner evidence that further delay in providing eagle
feathers would “hinder the ability of Native Americans to engage
in their traditional way of life.”206
On remand, the District Court for Utah took in facts and expert
testimony estimating populations of both eagles and adherents of
Native religions, together with their likely identities to assess the
impacts of extending eligibility to non-members of recognized
tribes and considered two alternative regulatory schemes: the one
that Wilgus’s lawyers suggested, extending management of
repository feathers to the recognized tribes, and also one of the
court’s own making, extending permit eligibility to all sincere
practitioners whatever their identity.
Holding in 2009 that the latter alternative was a less restrictive
means for the government to pursue its compelling interest,207

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1153 (D. Utah 2009). The judge

found Wilgus’s suggested alternative regulatory scheme, allowing enrolled members of
federally recognized tribes to give their feathers to whomever they like, unworkable because
it was impossible to enforce. But he found persuasive that another discussed alternative,
allowing non-Native adherents to apply directly to the Repository, would be a less restrictive
means, since natural resource managers could ask any nonnative to produce a permit, and
since government concerns that a black market would ensue are speculative.
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Federal District Judge Dee Benson ruled that the Eagle Act as
applied to Hardman and Wilgus violated RFRA.208 In so doing,
Judge Benson extended the reconceptualization of Native
American religion even beyond that countenanced by the Tenth
Circuit’s 2002 decision,209 and certainly disregarded the cautionary
direction of Judge Murphy’s concurring opinion.210 Judge Benson
concluded that the newly gathered evidence, including scholarship
on Native American religions, only further complicated the
government’s calculus about the religious interests of recognized
tribes: “Native American religions are neither hierarchical nor
homogenous, and there is considerable disagreement among tribes
holding eagle feathers sacred regarding the appropriate role—if
any—of persons who are not tribal members in tribal worship.”211
Citing a 2003 meeting of Arvol Looking Horse, the Lakota
Keeper of the White Buffalo Calf Pipe, and other northern plains
spiritual leaders discussing the “protection from the abuse and
exploitation of our ceremonies,” the judge noted “abundant
evidence . . . that some tribes do not welcome the participation of
non-Native Americans in traditional Native American religious
practices.”212 But citing a response to that declaration by leaders of
a Sun Dance that welcomed non-Natives, the judge noted the
“equally vehement conviction of other individuals and tribes that
individual belief is enough to warrant inclusion in Native
American religious rituals.” Following the testimony of Raymond
Bucko, a scholar of Native American religions, the judge concluded
“[t]here is no single, coherent approach even within a particular
tribe as to whether non-Native American adherents should be
permitted to participate in Native American religions and possess
the eagle feathers necessary to do so fully.”213 Noting that Wilgus
and Hardman’s religious practice was connected to Native
community members, the judge asserted:

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
United States v. Hardman 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Id. at 1136-40 (Murphy & Briscoe, JJ. concurring).
Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
Id. at 1136–37.
Id. at 1138.
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The Paiutes of Cedar City and the Hopi Tribe in Arizona who
gave feathers to Mr. Wilgus and Mr. Hardman would presumably
feel that a permitting system that allowed them to transfer
feathers to those they deemed worthy protected and promoted
their culture and religious beliefs. . . . Other tribes would no doubt
feel their interests harmed . . . . Whatever policy it chooses, the
government will have furthered its compelling interest with
regard to some tribes and frustrated it with regard to others.214

“The government’s task of fostering Native American culture is
a perilous one,” Judge Benson wrote.215
Noting that Judge Benson’s 2009 ruling moved even further
from holdings in the other appellate courts, the United States
appealed in the case of Wilgus.216 In 2011, a three-judge panel of the
Tenth Circuit reversed in favor of the United States and
against Wilgus.
Procedurally, the 2011 decision took into account the Tenth
Circuit’s 2009 holding in United States v. Friday, that the least
restrictive means analysis would not be merely a question of fact
but one of law, and deepened its review of the lower court’s
reasoning.217 But the key move made by the panel in 2011 was to
settle on a controlling interpretation of the government’s
compelling interest with regard to protecting Native American
religion, which presented two different options as it came out of the
en banc decision in Hardman. The 2011 decision opted for the
“protection of the culture of federally-recognized Indian tribes” as
the controlling construal of the trust responsibility, rather than the
language in the majority opinion of its holding in Hardman: that of
“preserving Native American culture in-and–of-[itself]” potentially
“as a thing separate and apart from those Indian tribes to whom the
government owes a trust obligation.”218 The 2011 Wilgus court
found this not only in better keeping with the initial formulation in
Hardman, citing the typical grounding for the special federal
relationship with the tribes and the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Morton v. Mancari and other Indian law cases, but also with its
214. Id. at 1139.
215. Id. at 1139 n.10.
216. The United States did not appeal in the case of Hardman, perhaps because of his

having children who were members of a federally recognized tribe.
217. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
218. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011).
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interpretation of congressional purpose in the Eagle Act itself,
noting the statute authorizes permits
“for the religious purposes of Indian tribes” [when it could have
read] “for the purposes of Native American religion.” Such
wording would have been a clear indication to courts that
Congress saw itself as protecting and promoting Native American
religion per se, rather than as expressed in the religion of
federally-recognized tribal members. But Congress specifically
chose to tie the exception to “Indian tribes,” rather than individual
practitioners. From this we infer that Congress saw the statutory
exception not as protecting Native American religion qua
religion, but rather as working to preserve the culture and religion
of federally-recognized tribes.219

The 2011 Wilgus Court also elaborated on the implications of
embedding its understanding of the compelling interest in the
religious exemption to the Eagle Act in keeping with the principles
of federal Indian law made clear in Mancari. The first implication is
that this steers clear of Fourteenth Amendment challenges:
[E]ven though we are not considering an equal protection or due
process attack on the Eagle Act, we note that the language of the
exception to the possession ban in the Eagle Act refers specifically
to “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.” 16 U.S.C. § 668a. The
Act thus draws a distinction between Native Americans and nonNative Americans based on the “quasi-sovereign” status of
the tribes.220

The second implication is that the holding steers clear of
violations of the Establishment Clause, based on the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Mancari that federally recognized tribes are
political, rather than religious or racial, in nature.221
Having clarified its controlling interpretation of the
government’s compelling interest in protecting religions of
federally recognized tribes, the three judge panel turned to the least

219. Id. at 1286 (emphasis omitted).
220. Id. at 1286–87.
221. To this, in a note, the implication was added that this interpretation of federally

recognized tribal religions keeps the courts from having to make the choice the district court
had signaled between advancing some and frustrating some religious interests of federally
recognized tribes with different postures toward non-Native adherents. Id. at 1288 n.5.
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restrictive means analysis and considered an alternative raised by
Wilgus to let enrolled members of recognized tribes determine
whether they can grant feathers to others.222 The panel also
considered an alternative to open the permit process to all sincere
adherents of Native religions, the option identified as less
restrictive by the district court.223 The former alternative was
discounted as unenforceable and conducive to developing a black
market; the latter was seen to depart from the compelling interest
as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit. It would “harm the very
population that [the exemption] was designed to help” by
increasing already lengthy wait times, “[a]nd it would do so in
order to help non-tribal practitioners of Native American religion,
a group not encompassed within the compelling governmental
interest supporting the Eagle Act.”224
The court found the current permit process to be the least
restrictive means: “[b]y allowing only members of federallyrecognized tribes an essential though otherwise prohibited
commodity (eagle feathers and parts), the United States ensures
that those tribes are able to continue to practice their traditional
culture to the greatest extent possible.”225
C. Courts Recognizing Collective Rights to Native Religions
In the Eagle Act accommodation cases, we have a sustained,
decade-long conversation about what manner of thing a Native
American religion is, translated into the technical language of the
law in cases forced to make difficult judgments involving
competing claims to Native American religious exercise.
The First, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits chose to view the
asserted religious freedom claims through the refracting lens of
established federal Indian law, with its insistence on tribal
identities as political, not racial or religious, and rooted in collective
rights based in treaty obligations and a federal trust obligation to
222. Because the alternative that the district court had chosen emerged in the
proceedings but was presented by neither party, the Tenth Circuit challenged the district
court’s conclusion that another regulatory scheme was less restrictive. “A statute that asks
whether a regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving an end is not an open-ended
invitation to the judicial imagination.” Id. at 1289.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1293.
225. Id. at 1295.
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members of those tribes. Through the proverbial back door of
established Indian law, these courts have determined that the
collective rights of tribes to their particular Native religions would
outweigh the religious rights of individual practitioners of Native
religions. It is also true that the claims to religious freedom by Fire
Bird Gibson, Cowichan Salish Canadian Leonard Antoine, Ray
Hardman, and Samuel Ray Wilgus were found sincere and
troublingly burdened. This reiterates that Native American
religions were not matters of collective rights alone, but practices
and communities that could extend beyond the boundaries of tribal
membership. If all this is true and (for the moment) settled, the
cases also show how contingent are those references to the
collective rights to religion when squared with individual rights to
Native religions by Native Americans whose claims do not clearly
align with the federally recognized tribes.
Contingent, indeed. Still pursuing his religious rights to take an
eagle for the Northern Arapaho Sun Dance after the Tenth Circuit
had rebuffed his efforts to undo a conviction for a previous eagle
hunt,226 Winslow Friday—or rather the Northern Arapaho Tribe on
his behalf—sought a permit in 2009 to take two bald eagles for
ceremonial purposes on the Wind River Reservation, a reservation
which is complexly shared by two tribes, the Eastern Shoshone and
Friday’s Northern Arapaho. As the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
was processing the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s application for a
permit, the Eastern Shoshone Tribe raised an issue with a
contemplated permit, citing that tribe’s cultural and religious
objections to eagle hunting on the reservation and the compelling
government interest of the federal government’s trust
responsibility to preserve and protect its tribal religion.227 The Fish
and Wildlife Service made a compromise determination, allowing
“the [Northern Arapaho Tribe] to take a live eagle for religious
purposes in a manner that would avoid . . . burdening the religious
and cultural beliefs and practices of the [Eastern Shoshone Tribe]”

226. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008). Friday was prevented from
acquiring an eagle through the permit and distribution process under BGEPA, citing the
need for a ritually pure eagle.
227. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1165-66 (D. Wyo. 2015).
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and issuing a permit for taking two bald eagles within Wyoming,
but expressly not on the Wind River Reservation.228
When the Northern Arapaho Tribe challenged the agency’s
decision under the Free Exercise Clause, the Federal District Court
for Wyoming agreed that Northern Arapaho free exercise rights
were violated in the compromise decision, drawing support from
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby and Holt to expressly
rethink a 2012 district court determination that an Arapaho man’s
rights under RFRA were not violated because the compromise
was “the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling
governmental interests in protecting eagle populations and in
protecting the religions and cultures of both the [Northern
Arapaho Tribe] and the [Eastern Shoshone Tribe].”229 Specifically,
the rethinking turned on the proper weighing of the compelling
government interest of “fostering and protecting the culture and
religion of federally-recognized Indian tribes” established in
Hardman in light of the Supreme Court’s clarification of
compelling government interest in Hobby Lobby and Holt.230 I note
that Hobby Lobby and Holt, evaluations of RFRA and RLUIPA did
not address the value of a compelling government interest to the
First Amendment.
The Wyoming opinion drew support from a case in Texas that
had led to the Fifth Circuit’s 2014 reevaluation, in light of Hobby
Lobby, of the logic of Hardman and Wilgus in support of the federal
government’s restriction of eagle feather access under the Eagle Act
to members of federally recognized tribes. In this case, McAllen
Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, a member of the federally
unrecognized Lipan Apache tribe and pastor of a church that
engages in renewal of Native American traditions, brought a
religious freedom challenge that a district court found inconsistent
228. Id. (citing the record at 533).
229. Id. at 1167. Ashe noted that a November 5, 2012, Court Order affirming “the

current permit reflects the least restrictive means of furthering the [Defendants’] compelling
interests.” Id. An additional claim under the Administrative Procedure Act was rejected by
the district court.
230. Id. at 30, 37. The District Court for Wyoming also cited Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), a RFRA case, as prompting a rethinking of
the compelling government interest of preserving and protecting the religions and cultures
of federally recognized tribes, but failed to acknowledge the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of
this Hardman logic in its 2011 ruling in Wilgus, which did not view O Centro in this light.
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with the case law considered above.231 But on appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded, drawing on developments from
Hobby Lobby to chart a different direction in weighing the
compelling interest of the federal trust responsibility. In its
regulations, the Fifth Circuit found:
[T]he government must show that the challenged law as applied to
the claimant satisfies the compelling interest . . . . Therefore,
“general statements of its interests” are not sufficient to demonstrate
a compelling governmental interest; rather, the interests need to
be closely tailored to the law. Where a regulation already provides
an exception from the law for a particular group, the government
will have a higher burden in showing that the law, as applied,
furthers the compelling interest.232

Noting that the United States had argued its accommodations
under the Eagle Act do not spell out a group right, per se, since they
apply to individual tribal members, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
emphatically endorsed the compelling interest of the federal trust
responsibility to “Indian tribes.” The Fifth Circuit observed that
“‘Indian tribes’ in this particular section” were not defined by
Congress when it created the Eagle Act accommodation in 1962. But
because “the [Interior] Department’s approach has not been
entirely uniform on this,” the court found, “we cannot definitively
conclude that Congress intended to protect only federally
recognized tribe members’ religious rights in this section.”233
The Fifth Circuit took pains also to align its recognition of
Pastor Soto’s rights in terms of his membership in the Lipan Apache
Tribe, and to note that while that tribe is not currently federally
recognized, it is recognized in the Texas State Senate, and by
reference to an 1838 Treaty, has “lived in Texas and Northern
Mexico for 300 years and . . . had a ‘government to government’
relationship with the Republic of Texas, the State of Texas, and the
United States government.”234 The Court also noted that the Lipan
Apache tribe, as a non-profit, was, among the four hundred

231.
232.
233.
234.

McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473–74 (citing S. Con. Res. 438, 81st Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2009)).
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federally unrecognized tribes, one of only fifty that had received
federal funding.235
The limited nature of this ruling is underscored in Judge
Jones’s concurrence:
Soto is without dispute an Indian and a member and regular
participant in the Lipan Apache Tribe, which, although not
federally recognized, has long historical roots in Texas. The panel
opinion discusses—and is also limited by—Soto’s RFRA claim
based on his and his tribe’s status. No more should be read into
the RFRA protection intended by this decision. Both the
conservation of eagles and the way of life of federally recognized
Indian tribes are of signal national importance, as indicated by
decades of federal law and regulations. . . . Broadening the
universe of “believers” who seek eagle feathers might then
seriously endanger the religious practices of real Native
Americans. Soto’s status does not eliminate the potential
problems, which will be explored at trial, but cabins this case to
Native American co-religionists.236

In this regard, the Fifth Circuit draws on Hobby Lobby to bring
heightened attention to some of the contradictions of the federal
recognition process and to, in effect, extend the logic of the nationto-nation trust responsibility with Indian tribes in a particular case,
rather than to elevate rights to the mere practice of a Native
American religion by non-Native practitioners in general. In other
words, McAllen adds weight to eagle feather claims by members of
non-recognized tribes with compelling cases toward recognition,
like state recognition or treaties, and may steer Eagle Act
enforcement and administration accordingly. Indeed after the Fifth
Circuit’s reversal and remand to the district court, Interior
Secretary Sally Jewell signed a settlement agreement with Pastor
Soto and specifically listed members of his church and three other
groups involved in the litigation, recognizing their right to possess
eagle feathers and their eligibility to apply to the repository for
further eagle parts.237 Although the agreement committed the

235. Id. at 474 n.12 (citing U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-348, Indian Issues:
Federal Funding for Non-Federally Recognized Tribes 10 (2012)).
236. Id. at 480 (Jones, J., concurring).
237. Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7:07-cv00060 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2016).
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Interior Secretary to consider and seek public comment on a
petition to modify the existing Eagle Act regulations, the agreement
also contained the reach of any exemptions to those regulations at
this time to the listed members of the Grace Brethren Church, the
Native American New Life Center, the San Antonio Indian
Fellowship, and the South Texas Indian Dancers Association. Such
would presumably not extend to non-native practitioners asserting
solo claims or for such self-proclaimed tribal entities as Erwin
Rupert’s Tribe of Pahana.238
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
If the Eagle Act accommodation cases are potentially seen as
mere instances of judicial reasoning about Native religions as
group rights sneaking in through the back door, and in ways that
were explicitly locked out of the house in the Ninth Circuit’s San
Francisco Peaks decision discussed above, we can turn more
forthrightly to the front door reasoning of international human
rights law, especially as clarified in the 2007 U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).239 Although the category of
religion has received less elaboration in international human rights
law as it has in the context of U.S. law, UNDRIP makes very clear
that where indigenous peoples are concerned, rights to religion
must be seen as collective as well as individual.240
Religious freedom is of course consistently articulated in the
major international human rights instruments. Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) provides that:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,

238. See Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992).
239. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 24. Here I will not elaborate on two other relevant

instruments, the International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
169 (1989) and the Organization of American States’ Working Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.
240. For implications of applying UNDRIP to domestic U.S. law, see WALTER R. ECHOHAWK, IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE 222–79 (2013).
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practice, worship and observance.”241 Article 4(2) of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976),
ratified by the United States, clarifies that rights of religious
conscience are, along with rights to life, freedom from slavery and
torture, among the non-derogable rights that cannot be suspended
in states of emergency.242
But the legal force for indigenous peoples of human rights to
religion has been very much qualified in international law. This
owes, in part, to a substantive problem: indigenous claims to
traditional lands, traditional livelihoods, and traditional forms of
governance can be meaningfully religious, and not simply or
plainly economic, political, or cultural. It owes also to a structural
problem: that indigenous peoples as peoples are betwixt and
between the effective units of international human rights law. On
the one hand, the nation states under Article 1 of both the ICCPR
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights are the “peoples” with rights of self-determination, but are
individuals within those nation states who enjoy human rights on
the other. Even as aggregates of such individuals with
internationally recognized “minority rights,” indigenous peoples
and their claims have often been illegible.243
But in the last decades, international human rights law is
increasingly recognizing that such universal human rights, in order
truly to be universal, must apply in distinctive ways to the world’s
indigenous peoples as collective rights. The UNDRIP, with its
insistence on rights of peoples, not merely indigenous people,
makes this boldly plain. UNDRIP begins as follows in Article I:
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a
collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human
rights law.”244

241. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, (Dec.
10, 1948).
242. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(2), Dec. 19, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
243. For a fuller discussion, see Michael D. McNally, Religion as Peoplehood: Native
American Religious Traditions and the Discourse of Indigenous Rights, in HANDBOOK OF
INDIGENOUS RELIGION(S) 52 (Greg Johnson & Siv Ellen Kraft eds., 2017).
244. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 24, at art. 1.
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The Declaration engages, rather than avoids, the category of
religion in its elaboration of collective rights, but unlike the terse
words of the First Amendment religion clauses and other human
rights instruments, the Declaration elaborates on what protection
of “religious traditions” might entail in terms of the collective
practices of indigenous communities. Article 12 reads:
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and
ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use
and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the
repatriation of their human remains.245

And this more explicit elaboration on rights pertaining to
religious and spiritual traditions follows a broader discussion of
cultural rights in Article 11: “Indigenous peoples have the right to
practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This
includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present
and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological
and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and
visual and performing arts and literature.”246
If these two articles key into its specifically religious provisions,
UNDRIP does not content itself with a view of indigenous religions
as merely or plainly religious. In fact, religious or spiritual
considerations are clearly mentioned in five other provisions
protecting various elements of culture247 and implicitly present in
further considerations of rights to oral traditions, philosophies, and
languages,248 culturally inflected medicine,249 and traditional
ecological knowledge.250 Most salient here is UNDRIP’s explicit
recognition in Article 25 of rights to “maintain and strengthen” an
indigenous people’s “spiritual relationship” with traditional
“lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at art. 12.
Id. at art. 11.
Id. at arts. 25, 31, 34–36. For a fuller discussion, see McNally, supra note 194.
G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 24, art. 13.
Id. at art. 24.
Id. at art. 31.
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to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in
this regard.”251
When UNDRIP was adopted nearly unanimously by the
General Assembly in 2007, the United States was alone with
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in refusing to do so. But in
2010, the United States formally adopted UNDRIP with
reservations, but with no reservations directly related to religious
or cultural matters. Indeed in the accompanying statement, the U.S
committed itself to:
[P]romoting and protecting the collective rights of indigenous
peoples as well as the human rights of all individuals. The United
States underlines its support for the Declaration’s recognition in
the preamble that indigenous individuals are entitled without
discrimination to all human rights recognized in international
law, and that indigenous peoples possess certain additional,
collective rights. The United States reads all of the provisions of
the Declaration in light of this understanding of human rights and
collective rights.252

Angela Riley and Kristen Carpenter have offered framing of
how international institutions, domestic nations, and indigenous
peoples themselves are operationalizing the aspirations of UNDRIP
in this “jurisgenerative moment.”253 Perhaps most important are
the subtle ways that the language and norms of UNDRIP gain legal
traction as they gradually come to animate the arguments and
conversations about indigenous rights at each level. I won’t
elaborate fully here, except to point out that at the international
level, the United Nations has taken important structural steps to
hardwire indigenous peoples’ representation into its work. This
occurs through bodies like the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
the newly charged Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, through high profile events like the 2014 World

251. Id. at art. 25.
252. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 12, 2011) https://2009
-2017.state.gov/s/srgia/154553.htm.
253. Kristen Carpenter & Angela R. Riley. Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative
Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173 (2014).
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Conference on Indigenous Peoples at the General Assembly,254 and
more focused measures to incorporate indigenous issues centrally
into the work of the U.N.255
There is not yet express elaboration in UNDRIP or its
implementation apparatus as to how religious rights of indigenous
peoples are to be implemented as collective rights. And if, in the
near term, U.S. courts are reluctant to engage the non-binding
UNDRIP in their interpretation of U.S. law,256the clarifications of
the Declaration can, and increasingly will, inform the making of U.S.
law and policies in recognizing the collective nature of Native
American religious freedom.
V. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. (2014)
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under RFRA, the
religious exercise of three closely held corporations was unlawfully
burdened by the contraceptive mandate under the Affordable Care
Act, and the 5-4 decision—one of “startling breadth” in the view of
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent—turned on a holding that closely held
for-profit corporations are “persons” capable of “religious
exercise” that triggers RFRA’s strict scrutiny analysis
when burdened.257

254. See G.A. Res. 69/2 (Sept. 22, 2014). U.N. General Assembly, Outcome Document
of the High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly Known as the World Conference
on Indigenous Peoples, A/Res/69/2 (22 September, 2014). This document includes the
revised mandate of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to better
promote and monitor the operationalizing of UNDRIP.
255. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 71/321 (Sept. 8, 2017) U.N. General Assembly, Enhancing the
Participation of Indigenous Peoples’ Representatives and Institutions in Meetings of Relevant United
Nations Bodies on Issues Affecting Them A/71/L.82 (Sept. 2017). Consider also how indigenous
concerns increasingly inform the periodic review, monitoring, and reporting mechanisms
related to other U.N. instruments like the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Id.
256. A brief database search survey of 59 federal court cases that invoke UNDRIP were
overwhelmingly dismissive, often with pro se litigants raising the Declaration in a decidedly
non-starter manner. Still, a good case can be made that UNDRIP clarifies how religious rights
are properly to be seen as collective, not just individual, under binding human rights
instruments like ICCPR and the UDHR.
257. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that the religious
freedom of a retail chain with 13,000 employees, which is owned by a family that believes
life begins at conception, and the religious freedom of two other corporations was unlawfully
violated by the contraception coverage requirement under the Affordable Care Act).
Affordable Care Act of 2010, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2); §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2).

275

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/13/19 10:16 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

The Hobby Lobby ruling clears ground in two important respects
for courts’ consideration of Native American religious exercise
claims under RFRA as matters of collective, not just individual,
religious liberty. First, the Hobby Lobby Court proposed a novel
reading of RFRA not merely as a restorative action following Smith
but as a law passed “in order to provide very broad protection for
religious liberty,” indeed extending beyond protections the
Supreme Court had allowed for First Amendment free exercise
accommodations prior to its 1990 decision in Smith.258 Second, on
the premise of this expansive view of Congress’s intent in RFRA,
the Court held that RFRA’s language of “persons,” whose religious
exercise implicates RFRA, could include for-profit corporations.259
In substantiating that view against the arguments of a vigorous
dissent and considerably settled matters of corporate law, the
Hobby Lobby Court elaborates on the nature of a corporation’s
religious exercise to suggest that for-profit corporations, like the
many religious congregations and religious associations that
organize as non-profits, exercise religion that is more than the sum
of the aggregate parts. In other words, as an artificial person, the
corporation is not simply an individual, but a collective entity.
A. RFRA’s Expansive Reach in Hobby Lobby
To orient its settling of the key legal question in Hobby Lobby of
whether a closely held for-profit corporation could qualify as a
“person” whose religious exercise was protected under RFRA, the
Supreme Court took the position that Congress passed RFRA to
“provide very broad protection for religious liberty,” that
“Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is
constitutionally required,”260 and that RFRA did more than merely
restore the compelling government interest analysis that had held
sway in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment free exercise
jurisprudence prior to its 1990 Smith decision. In other words, to
square the conclusion that at least certain for-profit corporations
have religious liberty rights despite the Supreme Court’s explicit
rejection of such claims under the First Amendment,261 the Hobby
258.
259.
260.
261.

276

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693.
Id., slip. op. at 19–31.
Id. at 684, 706.
Id. at 739–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

005.MCNALLY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

205

8/13/19 10:16 AM

Native American Religious Freedom as a Collective Right

Lobby Court had to assert that the legislated religious freedom
protections of RFRA were meant to go beyond those of the First
Amendment as the Supreme Court had allowed them before Smith.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg identified this as an “errant premise”
after which the Court “falters at each step of its analysis.” Justice
Ginsburg wrote, “[p]ersuaded that Congress enacted RFRA to
serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the havoc the
Court’s judgment can introduce, I dissent.”262
If this was a puzzling departure from the High Court’s two
previous rulings on RFRA, in which it had taken pains to either
contain the statute’s reach by finding it unconstitutional as applied
to the states263 or as only providing narrow protections to generally
applicable federal laws,264 the very departure in Hobby Lobby carries
significant implications for the concerns of this Article.
To return to the San Francisco Peaks case, the Ninth Circuit
majority in Navajo Nation had taken the approach of the Hobby Lobby
dissent that the proper context for interpreting RFRA’s language of
“substantial burden” was a narrow congressional intent that RFRA
simply restore the status quo ante of First Amendment free exercise
jurisprudence prior to Smith. The Ninth Circuit turned to Lyng,
which predated Smith by two years, as the controlling precedent for
the interpretation of “substantial burden.”265 Because the Lyng
court had found that government approval of a logging road
through precincts sacred to three California claimant tribes did not
“prohibit” their First Amendment protected free exercise, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the threshold of a “substantial burden” of
religious exercise under RFRA was not crossed by government
approval of a ski area’s snowmaking with treated wastewater on a
mountain sacred to the claimant tribes. And despite a varying
holding on that legal question in a Tenth Circuit sacred land
decision,266 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2009.267

262. Id. at 740 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
263. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
264. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.

418 (2006).
265. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1071-74 (9th Cir. 2008); Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S. at 748–49 (Ginsburg, dissenting).
266. Comanche Nation v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla. 2008).
267. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009) (per curiam), cert. denied.
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Faced with a fairly plain narrative that RFRA followed Smith
directly and was expressly intended to restore the First
Amendment free exercise jurisprudence on neutral laws of general
applicability which the Court took away in Smith, the Hobby Lobby
Court supported its expansive interpretation of congressional
intent in RFRA on two bases. First, against a conventional view that
its decision in City of Boerne restricted RFRA by declaring it
unconstitutional as applied to the states, the Hobby Lobby majority
found in that holding an acknowledgment of RFRA’s broad reach
as applied to the federal government: “[w]e held that Congress had
overstepped its Section 5 authority because ‘[t]he stringent test
RFRA demands’ ‘far exceeds any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as
interpreted in Smith.’”268
Where the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, who had
joined the City of Boerne decision argued otherwise on this point,
the Hobby Lobby majority asserted that the “stringent test” in
question, the least restrictive means test, did not inhere in pre-Smith
free exercise precedent.269 Justice Ginsburg found in error the City
of Boerne’s decision that the least restrictive means requirement
“was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence that RFRA purported
to codify.”270
Next, the Hobby Lobby Court turned to a provision of RLUIPA,
which Congress ironically passed as a more narrowly tailored
response to the constraints of City of Boerne. Because the provision
amended RFRA’s definition of “religious exercise” by deleting an
original reference to First Amendment holdings prior to Smith and
by expanding the definition of “exercise of religion” to include “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief,”271 the Hobby Lobby Court understood
Congress’s intent in RFRA “to effect a complete separation from the
First Amendment case law.”272 The Court also cited RLUIPA’s
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 695 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533–34).
Id. at 736.
Id. at 749–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A).
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent found
implausible the suggestion that RLUIPA’s alteration did more than simply relieve courts of
the impossible task of determining the “centrality” of a particular religious exercise. Justice
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statement that this newly defined “exercise of religion” “be
construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this act and
the Constitution.”273
The following year, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed lower court rulings and found a Muslim
inmate was entitled to grow a beard for religious purposes even
though it violated the regulations of an Arkansas corrections
facility.274 In that case, the inmate’s religious freedom claims were
made under RLUIPA, but the High Court related the two statutes,
noting RLUIPA thus allows “prisoners ‘to seek religious
accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in
RFRA.’”275 What is important for our purposes is that the
Supreme Court in Holt found erroneous the lower courts’ appeal
to First Amendment cases to hold that the grooming policy did
not substantially burden Holt’s practice of Islam, underscoring
its Hobby Lobby holding that Congress intended RFRA and
RLUIPA to expand religious freedom protections beyond the
First Amendment and applying that logic to the substantial
burden analysis:
[T]he District Court erred by concluding that the grooming
policy did not substantially burden petitioner’s religious
exercise because “he had been provided a prayer rug and a list
of distributors of Islamic material, he was allowed to
correspond with a religious advisor, and was allowed to
maintain the required diet and observe religious holidays.” . . .
In taking this approach, the District Court improperly
imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners’
First Amendment rights.276

Ginsburg cited Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring):
“The amendment in no way suggests that Congress meant to expand the class of entities
qualified to mount religious accommodation claims.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 748 (Ginsburg,
J. dissenting).
273. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g).
274. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
275. Holt v. Hobbs, No. 13–6827, slip op. at 3 (U.S. 2015) (citing Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006)).
276. Holt, slip op. at 7 (citation omitted) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 351–52 (1987) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
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When the Holt court held the particular reasoning found in
those cases, “the availability of alternative means of practicing
religion,” to be “a relevant consideration,” it made an important
distinction. 277 The error was not tied to this particular strand of
reasoning, but to a strand of reasoning from cases involving
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, because “RLUIPA provides
greater protection.”278
B. Substantial Burdens in the Wake of Hobby Lobby
It must be said that when afforded the opportunity in a
similarly aligned 2016 case, courts have invoked Hobby Lobby and
Holt to narrow, not broaden, their approach to what counts as a
substantial burden.279 In Oklevueha Native American Church of
Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch (2016), the Ninth Circuit found the controlled
substance regulations did not substantially burden a religious
group in its religiously motivated access to marijuana and trigger
RFRA protections.280 Despite its deliberately indigenous name,
Oklevueha only nominally aligns with Navajo Nation, since it is not a
sacred lands case and more importantly since it involves a
decidedly non-Native religious group.281 Notably, the “Native”
Native American Church filed an amicus brief against the
Oklevueha effort to associate their claims with hard won
accommodations for the Native American Church, emphasizing
that the Native American Church has no ceremonial regard for

277. Id.
278. Id. at 7-8.
279. For more on how Hobby Lobby and Holt have been applied in the context of Eagle

Act cases to broaden the RFRA religious freedom rights of individuals excluded, see supra
note 222 for discussion of McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar (2016).
280. Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1016–
18 (9th Cir. 2016).
281. Id. at 1012. A reasonable person visiting a webpage affiliated with the group could
very well conclude that Oklevueha is a decidedly non-Native religious group. Membership,
which costs $200, or $30 for members of federally recognized tribes, “provides you a means
to receive your constitutional rights in attending earth based indigenous American Native
spiritually empowering and healing ceremonies—especially Native American Church
indigenous ceremonies that involve sacraments (peyote, cannabis, ayahuasca, etc [sic]) that
are otherwise illegal for Non-Members to partake and or be in possession of.” Why Being a
Member of Oklevueha Native American Church will Benefit You, OKLEVUEHA NATIVE AMERICAN
CHURCH, https://nativeamericanchurches.org/joining-oklevueha-why-and-how/ (last
visited Jan. 19, 2019).
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marijuana.282 Nevertheless, in holding that the controlled
substance laws did not substantially burden the Oklevueha
practitioners, the Ninth Circuit turned to its Navajo Nation
position that “substantial burden” be interpreted in light of Lyng:
absent unless the government action coerces a practitioner into
acting contrary to belief. The Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that
Oklevueha practitioners considered Peyote their key sacrament,
cannabis being merely a substitute and that “foregoing cannabis
[was] not contrary to their religious beliefs.”283
But in its effort to distinguish Oklevueha from Hobby Lobby and
instead to tie it to Navajo Nation, a Harvard Law Review Case
Comment argues the Ninth Circuit conflated two different senses
of substantial burden:284
There are at least two things that “substantial” could modify.
First, it could be that the government has to put substantial or
heavy pressure on you to violate your religious beliefs [such as
the large fine in Hobby Lobby]. But it could also be that the
government has to pressure you to violate your religious beliefs
in some substantial or serious way. For example, maybe the
government is asking you to violate a particularly important tenet
of your religion, not just some discretionary one.285

In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit found no substantial burden
because the government action was not substantial in the manner
of its burden; the court rejected an argument that Forest Service
approval of the sewage to snowmaking plan forced the tribes to act
contrary to their religion, a position that I argue above is not an
accurate conclusion from the accepted facts in that case.286 In
Oklevueha, however, it was the practice of using cannabis, which the

282. Brief for the National Council of Native American Churches et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees at 8–9, Oklevueha, 828 F.3d 1012 (No. 14-15143).
283. Oklevueha, 828 F.3d at 1016.
284. Case Comment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act—Substantial Burden—Ninth
Circuit Holds that Federal Cannabis Prohibition is Not a Substantial Burden—Oklevueha Native
American Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV.
785 (2016).
285. Id. (citing Chad Flanders, Substantial Confusion about “Substantial Burdens,” 27 U.
ILL. L. REV. 28–29 (2016)).
286. See supra note 54.
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court noted was non-obligatory, that was insufficiently substantial,
not the burden of government regulation of cannabis.287
The Case Comment goes on to argue that, by rendering its
holding in Oklevueha as consistent with its holding in Navajo Nation,
the Ninth Circuit “enshrined” its substantial burden standard “as
among the most demanding in the nation by linking Navajo Nation’s
‘act contrary’ rule to the language of religious obligation, which
previous Ninth Circuit cases had not explicitly done.”288
C. Whither the RFRA Claim in Standing Rock II?
Similarly questionable logic was applied in the second round of
the Dakota Access Pipeline case, when the D.C. District Court judge
found the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s argument unavailing that
Army Corps’ approval of the Missouri River pipeline crossing
violated Lakota religious freedom rights under RFRA.289 As briefly
discussed at the outset of this Article, the district court found
primarily that the tribes’ request for a preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order was nullified by laches, since the tribes
did not bring the RFRA claim a half year earlier in their initial
motions for a preliminary injunction.290 But despite forceful
arguments of the tribes that Hobby Lobby had rendered Navajo
Nation and Lyng no longer controlling for such cases, the court
found that the RFRA claim would be unlikely to succeed on the
merits.291 The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had argued, first, that
unlike Navajo, the spiritual contamination of the only ritually pure
water available for Lakota ceremonies would “foreclose” the
practice of Lakota religion. Because the United States

287. Oklevueha, 828 F.3d at 1017.
288. Case Comment, supra note 284, at 790–91.
289. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Standing

Rock II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77, 88 (D.D.C. 2017).
290. Id. at 83 (“[L]aches bars the preliminary-injunctive relief requested (but not the
RFRA claim itself) and that the Tribe’s substantial-burden position is unlikely to achieve
success on the merits. Having so decided, the Court need not consider the remaining three
factors of the preliminary-injunction analysis—irreparable harm, balance of equities, and
public interest.”).
291. Id. at 100 (“The Court holds that Lyng likely prevents the Tribe from showing that
the Corps’ decision to grant an easement to Dakota Access to operate an oil pipeline under
Lake Oahe constitutes a substantial burden on its members’ free exercise of religion. The
Tribe, accordingly, is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its RFRA claim.”).
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has systematically deprived the Tribe of access to other water
sources as a function of its more than 200-yearlong campaign to
dispossess the Lakota people of their aboriginal lands and
resources. . . . [T]he Tribe and its members here are more closely
analogous to the prisoners whose only options in the exercise of
their religion are closely controlled by the government.292

Secondly, Cheyenne River argued that where the Lyng court
“could not vindicate Indian religious adherents’ challenge to a
government sanctioned project on the government’s own land
because to do so would imply in the Indian religious believer “de
facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious public
property,” the Lakota tribes had an “actual legal ownership interest
in the waters of Lake Oahe” and the U.S. had “a fiduciary
[responsibility] in the protection of those waters for the Tribe’s
benefit.”293 Finally, and most importantly, Cheyenne River took
pains to argue Navajo Nation was “no longer good law” in light of
Hobby Lobby and Holt for reasons argued above, and also because,
as in the case with Oklehueva, “the real question that RFRA presents
is ‘whether the [government regulation] imposes a substantial
burden on the ability of the plaintiff to [act] in accordance with their
religious beliefs,’ not ‘whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA
case is reasonable.’”294
The D.C. District Court rejected these arguments, instead
finding a direct line from Navajo Nation and especially Lyng, in
which the court found a tight analogy: “incidental, if serious impact
on a tribe’s295 ability to practice its religion because of spiritual
desecration of a sacred site.”296 Remarkably, the D.C. District Court

292. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 34, Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017)
[hereinafter CRST Motion].
293. Id. at 33–34.
294. Id. at 34–36 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014))
(brackets in the original).
295. Note, however, the slippage between the D.C. court’s discussion of a “tribe’s”
religious practice and the cited rendering of the burden in Lyng as a matter of interference
“with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment.” Standing Rock II, 239 F. Supp.
3d at 92 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988)).
296. Id. at 93; see also Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting RFRA claim for a federal prisoner objecting to government’s extracting of DNA
tissue samples).
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judge found additional support for the analogy with Lyng in the
fact that the land in question under Lake Oahe was flatly “federal
land,”297 obscuring the treaty claims, court protected water rights,
flooding of hundreds of thousands of acres of Lakota lands, and the
implicated federal trust responsibility that other courts, in other
contexts, had taken into account over and again.298 The Court cited
multiple authorities for the applicability of Lyng to RFRA cases and
held that Hobby Lobby and Holt, while extending RFRA’s religious
freedom beyond the constraints of First Amendment law prior to
Smith, did not do so in a manner that would advance Cheyenne
River’s specific claims.299 Hobby Lobby, the court agreed, showed
Congress intended in RFRA “to effect a complete separation from
First Amendment case law” with regard to the definition of
“exercise of religion,”300 but Hobby Lobby did not, the court held,
change anything about the “substantial burden” analysis, and thus
does not change the result because the Tribe “here faces no such
coercion or sanction.”301 And where Holt had made clear that
Congress in RLUIPA meant to lower the standard for a substantial
burden under First Amendment analysis,302 the district court held
this “does not impliedly overrule Lyng or otherwise undermine its
relevance here.”303
But as Cheyenne River had argued, there is a distinction to be
made between its case and that decided in Navajo Nation, following
Lyng. 304 In those cases, the spiritual fulfillment of individuals was
the rendering of the burdened practice: “‘the only effect of the

297. Standing Rock II, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 98 (“As the pipeline runs through the land
under the lake, rather than the lake’s waters, the Court first discusses ownership of the land
and then turns to the Tribe’s interest in the water.”).
298. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Sioux Nation v. United States,
448 U.S. 371 (1980); Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1983).
299. RFRA’s legislative history references to Lyng in understanding that pre-Smith
substantial burden standards should still apply in judicial interpretations of RFRA, and
approving appeals by appellate courts to Lyng in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Standing Rock II,
239 F. Supp. 3d at 93 (citing S. Rep. No 103-111 at 8–9 (1993); 139 Cong. Rec. S14461 at S14470
(Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Oct 27, 1993)).
300. Id. at 96 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014)).
301. Id. at 96–98.
302. CRST Motion, supra note 292, at 35 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015)).
303. Standing Rock II, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 98.
304. CRST Motion, supra note 292, at 35 (citing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service,
535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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proposed [government action] is on the Plaintiffs’ subjective,
emotional religious experience.’ In short the court held that the
burden imposed upon the Indian’s religious practice was too
weakly connected to the government regulation.”305 In Hobby Lobby,
by contrast, the real question that RFRA presents is “‘whether the
[government regulation] imposes a substantial burden on the
ability of the plaintiff to [act] in accordance with their religious
beliefs’, not ‘whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is
reasonable.’”306 The illogic of a tidy distinction between subjective,
emotional experience and substantially burdened free exercise,
Cheyenne River argued, is borne out even more clearly in the
prisoner cases:
Unless one is an observant Jew, the burden of being forced to eat
food that is not prepared in a kosher kitchen must seem subjective
and emotional, rather than objective and rational. Yet the
courts . . . did not apply a test of whether the belief was objective
and rational to determine whether it substantially burdened
prisoners forced to choose between eating non-kosher food or
violating their religious beliefs. To apply such a test would be to
question the validity of keeping kosher or observing halal
practices, which the law does not permit.307

The religious obligation standard signaled anew by Holt v.
Hobbs could be a game-changer for how sacred lands claims, when
there are—and there usually are—compelling accepted facts of
religious obligation akin to those accepted in the Navajo Nation case,
can pass the threshold of the substantial burden analysis. This
would be particularly compelling in a case that should arise in a
different circuit, perhaps especially within the Tenth Circuit, where
Comanche Nation v. United States applies a more expansive view of
substantial burden than in the Ninth Circuit’s Navajo Nation case.308
But even within the Ninth Circuit or other circuits holding its
view of substantial burden, the Supreme Court’s recognition in
Hobby Lobby of the religious exercise of a for-profit corporation,

305. Id. (brackets in the original).
306. Id. at 35–36 (citing Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,

Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014)) (brackets in the original).
307. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
308. Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D (W.D. Okla. 2008).
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could propel a view toward sacred land claims, or other claims
advanced by tribes, as matters of collective rights.
D. Hobby Lobby and Collective Rights
As “persons,” corporations as an entity are, strictly speaking,
legal individuals, and collectives only in the abstract, that exercise
religion. But ambiguities about corporations as legal individuals
emerged in the Court’s reasoning. In dicta, the Hobby Lobby majority
related its view of the ostensible collectivity involved:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people. . . . [P]rotecting the
free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga,
and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own
and control these companies.”309

The dissent, concerned about the “immoderate” view of RFRA
as inclusive of for-profit corporations’ religious exercise, worried
about an ambiguity in the collective nature of corporations as legal
persons. The dissent argued that the Court had potentially run
afoul of the Establishment Clause by privileging the owners’ beliefs
over the wide range of religious beliefs of the collective that makes
up a for-profit corporation (in contrast with religious communities
that incorporated not for profit making but expressly for shared
religious goals).310
If the Supreme Court has found that such for-profit
corporations as Hobby Lobby, which is comprised of more than
13,000 people, are “persons” exercising religious freedom rights, it
seems time for courts to conceive of the religious freedom claims of
American Indian tribes and Alaskan Native and Native Hawaiian

309. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 at 706–07.
310. Id. at 745–46. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The exemption sought by Hobby Lobby

and Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations’ employees and
covered dependents . . . . In sum, with respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech
claims, ‘your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.’”)
(quoting Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919)).
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communities, accordingly—not as aggregations of so many
indigenous individuals but as collective religious freedom rights of
the collectivities.
The analogy between for-profit corporations and sovereign
tribal governments is hardly airtight, to say the obvious. There are
distinctive traits of sovereignty to the over 550 federally recognized
tribes with their various constitutions, or even to the more
corporate models of the legal communities formed under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,311 and even in certain
contexts, to the legal entities— typically non-profit corporations
—through which non-recognized tribes organize.312 But where they
depart has little to do with the analogical point here. If the collective
rights logic of the Supreme Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby can
distinguish the protected religious exercise of the corporate
expression of a collectivity of 13,000 diverse individuals, it can
apply to legal expression of Native communities, even taking into
account the internal diversity of their members. This is
emphatically not to flatten all the arguments this Article has
advanced in the preceding parts into a Hobby Lobby framework, but
the Hobby Lobby moment does place in stark relief how doable it is
for courts to recognize the collective rights of Native American
religious freedom.313

311. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. ch. 33 (2012).
312. These can be, as in the case of the Lipan Apache Tribe of Texas, at the time of this

writing, recognized by state governments but not by the federal government. McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
313. Perhaps this is even more doable in light of the seating of Brett Kavanagh and
especially Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. When a judge in the Tenth Circuit, Justice
Gorsuch, joined the majority in the Hobby Lobby case, but further endorsed a view of RFRA’s
expansive reach in a concurring opinion: “RFRA is indeed something of a ‘super-statute.’”
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d. 1114, 1157 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). By one count, Judge Gorsuch had heard nearly seventy claims involving federal
Indian law of which he authored sixteen opinions. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Neil Gorsuch
Indian Law Record as Tenth Circuit Judge, TURTLE TALK (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:17 PM),
https://turtletalk.blog/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuch-indian-law-record-as-tenth-circuit-judge
/. In one of those opinions he submitted to his Supreme Court confirmation process, a RFRA
case involving prison sweat lodge access, Gorsuch showed a clear appreciation for the
distinctive significance of Native American religions. See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48
(10th Cir. 2014).
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CONCLUSION: THE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
OF NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
In this Article, I have argued that where Native American
sacred claims have consistently faltered under judicial applications
of religious freedom law, this has not been simply because, as many
have argued, Native religions have distinctive contours that are
hard to comprehend in the register of Judeo-Christian religions.
They have faltered also because courts have consistently
misrecognized claims to collective religious obligations and duties
advanced by tribes themselves and flattened them into mere
practices of an interiorized, subjective, and individual spiritual
fulfillment—spiritual, not religious. And this judicial record has
had the effect of discouraging Native communities from boldly
bringing religious freedom claims to safeguard sacred places,
practices, objects, and ancestral remains, turning instead to
remedies under environmental law, cultural property law, and
federal Indian law. But for all the intellectual and legal difficulties
of fitting distinctive Native American traditions into the category
of “religion,” religion and religious freedom remain power words
in American culture and law, as we have seen in Hobby Lobby and
other recent decisions.
Courts and lawmakers, I have argued, can do better to ensure
the religious freedom of Native Americans by reckoning more fully
with the distinctively collective shape of so many Native sacred
claims, especially when tribes are the litigants, wedding the robust
protections for religious freedom, especially under RFRA as the
Supreme Court interpreted it in Hobby Lobby, with the collectivist
protections of federal Indian law.
The long-established government-to-government relationship
between the U.S. and federally recognized tribes distinguishes
Native nations from other, merely religious, communities. Such an
approach, I have argued, is neither altogether novel nor as perilous
as recognizing collective rights elsewhere in religious freedom law.
Statutes like NAGPRA and AIRFA, together with AIRFA’s Peyote
Amendment, have grafted the substantive protection of religion
into the structural logic of federal Indian law and have stood up in
the courts because of the special political relationship with the
recognized tribes. For their part, courts too have distinguished
the distinctively collective shape of tribal religious interests from
288
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those of individuals, as seen especially in the case law on
accommodations under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act. Although such recognitions of the collective rights of Native
American religious freedom have relied on the distinction of
federal acknowledgement that excludes a significant number of
Native American communities and their members from fuller
religious freedom, this problem is not insurmountable; reasonable
distinctions can be and have been made by courts to include
members of at least some specific Native communities that lack
federal recognition but that are recognized by states.314
I have also argued that the current state of federal Indian law
on these questions need not define the horizon of legal imagination
here. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, although it is a non-binding instrument, makes explicit that
religious freedom rights elsewhere enumerated in binding
international human rights instruments must be regarded as
collective and not just individual rights if they are to meaningfully
apply to indigenous peoples.315
So, what might a more systematic regard for the collective
rights of Native American religious freedom look like?
Courts considering Native American free exercise claims under
the First Amendment can consider bundling religious free exercise
rights with obligations to recognized tribes under federal Indian
law. In its Employment Div. v. Smith holding, the Supreme Court
distinguished Smith from precedents like Wisconsin v. Yoder and
Sherbert v. Verner by saying the latter were never considerations of
religious freedom rights alone, but those rights bundled with other
rights, like free speech or parental rights.316 At the very least, as
Kristen Carpenter suggests, courts could invoke the special
relationship to the tribes.317 Similarly, as courts hear tribal claims

314. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014)..
315. Although the Canadian Supreme Court did not fully engage such an argument,

the Ktunaxa First Nation’s challenge to a proposed ski resort on sacred lands in British
Columbia raised the possibility of conceptually conjoining Canada’s recognition of collective
aboriginal rights under Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act with the Canadian Charter’s 2(a)
protections of religious freedom for all Canadians. See Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia,
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 386 (Can.).
316. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
317. Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 27, at 417–18.
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under RFRA, they should regard those claims not solely as religious
freedom claims of individuals but of tribes, or of individuals as
members of tribes, that implicate the United States’ governmentto-government relationship and trust responsibility to protect
and preserve the religions and cultures of those tribes and
their members.318
And where it comes to sacred land claims by tribes that are so
crucial to Native American religious freedom, courts should
rethink just how controlling Navajo Nation and Lyng should be in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby ruling that Congress
intended RFRA to go well beyond the pre-Smith jurisprudence. As
I argue above, the Native claims to sacred lands could very well
have prevailed in Navajo Nation were the case adjudicated in the
wake of Hobby Lobby.
Congress can do more to enact narrowly-tailored legislative
accommodations to promote fuller religious freedom for Native
Americans, along the lines of the UNDRIP and more immediately
along the lines of the Peyote Amendment of 1994 to AIRFA. Indeed
AIRFA, which the Lyng court found to lack the legal teeth of a
formal “cause of action” to bring suit, is one such congressional
clarification that could draw on the persuasive power of religious
freedom discourse as well as the clarification of the UNDRIP to
level the playing field of competing claims, especially on federal
lands, and to deliver on protection for Native sacred sites. In 2014,
the National Congress of American Indians passed a resolution
endorsing some suggested language for such an AIRFA cause of
action related to sacred sites.319 After the November 2016 elections,
one strains to imagine signed legislation in the short term; but
perhaps as the idea builds, the statutory language can make even
more explicit what AIRFA makes implicit—that Native American
religious freedom not only requires considerations beyond the
conventional understandings of religion in a majority Christian
country to include such things as sacred sites but that Native
318. AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996(1).
319. NCAI Res. ATL-14-032 (Ann. Sess. 2014) (The National Congress of American

Indians titled the Resolution as “Calling for Protection of Native Peoples’ Sacred Places,
Sacred Objects and Ancestors under United States, Native Nations and International Law,
Policy and Practice.”), http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/calling-for-protection
-of-native-peoples-sacred-places-sacred-objects-and-ancestors-under-united-states-native
-nations-and-international-law-policy-and-practice.
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American religious traditions may have far less to do with the
spiritual fulfillment of Native American individuals meditating in
pristine natural places, than with the collective obligations, and
rights, of Native nations.
Federal administrations have considerable room to bring
various agency policies to standards in keeping with the
government-to-government relationship and federal trust
responsibility and in aspiring to conform those policies to the
provisions of UNDRIP. Although this Article has left unexplored
this administrative terrain and what fuller accommodations for
collective rights of Native American religious freedom would look
like, it is clear that due diligence under current standards of
government-to-government consultation and in the federal review
obligations under environmental and historic preservation law
(much less incorporation of UNDRIP’s standard of indigenous
peoples’ free, prior, and informed consent on policies and
developments that impact them) would go far to negotiate
reasonable accommodations for Native communities’ sacred claims
in advance of costly litigation or costlier controversy in courts of
public opinion. As the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Energy
Transfer Partners, and the state of North Dakota learned the hard
way in terms of millions of dollars of lost revenue and lost clout, it
can make good fiscal sense—not just moral and legal sense—to
engage Native nations early and often to navigate impacts on what
they hold sacred, collectively.
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